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This thesis analyzes the role deception serves in the armed
forces of the Soviet Union. The analysis focuses on the
Soviets' mindset, historical application, military doctrine,
organization, and current application of military deception.
Before addressing the Soviet use of deception, an introduc-
tion is provided which includes some definitions and related
terms, a historical look at deception, and some basic decep-
tion principles. The thesis closes with a summary of the
main points concerning Soviet military deception and briefly
compares it to past and current application of deception in
the U. S. military.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Of all the various elements of military art developed
over the centuries, the one that has been the least
understood and the most neglected is the art of deception.
At times throughout the ages, it has been employed with
great success, only to be forgotten in the next war.
Deception can almost be considered a human trait or
characteristic but, cUriously, one which seems so basic to
one group's way of life and so alien to another. Indeed, the
inconsistency in the use of deception in warfare, both
within one group and when comparing one group's style of
warfare to that of another, has been conspicuous ever since
wars were recorded. On the one hand, we are told by such
military strategists as Sun Tsu that "all warfare is based
on deception CRef . 1: p. 66]*" but it becomes apparent to
the student of military history that, in practice, deception
has not been a part of every war. Only the greatest leaders
seem to understand its immense potential, and few of these
possess the skills to make full use of that potential.
Perhaps the key to unlocking these apparent
contradictions surrounding deception lies in a study of its
very nature. Is deception a law of warfare to which a
formula can be applied to ensure its uniform and consistent
employment? To the contrary, deception is, as the previous
paragraph implied, an art. Of course, the successful
execution of any element of warfare, whether a law of war or
military art, requires the cultivation of a certain degree
of skill, but it appears that skill alone is not enough for
deception. Perhaps more than any other element, the
effective use of deception demands a vivid imagination, one
which is not bound by conventional thinking but which is
accustomed to the unorthodox, the unexpected. Indeed, it is
this unconventional nature which ensures success in
deception, while predictability remains its anathema. It is
therefore not surprising that deception is often omitted
from battle plans. After all, why risk defeat through the
use of a military art as nebulous as deception, whose
outcome is anything but predictable, when there are safer,
more reliable methods of confronting one's opponent?
In studying the historical use of military deception, it
becomes apparent that each nation employs it in a different
manner and frequency than other nations. A focused study on
the Soviet Union's use of deception is of particular
interest in light of world political development since the
end of World War II. Such a study is especially appropriate
for the thesis of a U. S. military officer since the mutual
antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States
makes it possible at some future date for the two to
confront one another under combat conditions sometime in the
future. Considering the immense arsenals of these two
nations, the political alignment of much of the world within
one of the two camps, and the forty-year history of
political, economic, and ideological polemics between the
two, it is no exaggeration to predict that such a
confrontation would be of major military proportions. Every
available means, maneuver, trick, skill, etc. , both
political and military, would be marshaled in order to gain
every advantage possible. It has become popular to describe
this potential scenario as a "come as you are" war, a
description which is quite appropriate in this case since
all learning and development of military skills, other than
their refinement through combat experience, essentially
stops when war begins.
^I intentionally use the term "nation" here because it
is essentially the ethnic nature of a group of people which
governs that group s proclivity for the use of deception,
not just the legal entity that forms a "state.
"
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The role that deception will play in any military clash
between the Soviet Union and the United States is not
clear-cut, but a rough idea can be obtained by looking at
each nation' s historical use of the art and treatment of it
in current doctrine and practice. While the focus of this
thesis is on Soviet use of the art, U. S. use of deception
will also be addressed somewhat, particularly in the
concluding chapter. The goal of this thesis is to determine
the extent of the role deception plays in Soviet military
doctrine and operations, past and present, and then apply
that knowledge to develop an estimate of possible future
Soviet application of the art in a conventional military
confrontation with the United States. However, the goal does
not stop there; this paper has been written with the hope
that military leaders, decision-makers, and intelligence
officers, once aware of the disparity existing between
Soviet and U. S. deception capabilities, will make an effort
to rectify our shortfalls. Such an effort, however, should
not be made simply to "catch up" with the Soviets, but
instead, should be made as an endeavor to enrich our way of
war-fighting, in order that we may do so more effectively
and with a greater likelihood of success. Deception is an
art whose inclusion can significantly add to a military
operation's chance of success and should be considered for
employment on its own merit, regardless of whether the
opponent uses it.
A. OVERVIEW
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first
chapter is of an introductory nature and includes, in
addition to the opening paragraphs and this overview, a
section outlining the scope of the paper. The latter is of
some importance since it provides the rationale for a
somewhat unique treatment of the generally neglected subject
of deception.
The second chapter offers a general discussion of the
subject. Included is a section with definitions of
deception and its related terms, another section which takes
a historical look at deception and, finally, a list and
discussion of some basic principles which must be applied if
deception is to be employed successfully. These principles
have been compiled not only through theory and simple logic,
but also through practical application in many military
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exercises and some actual operations.
The next six chapters constitute the "meat" of this
thesis. Chapter III offers an overview of the general Soviet
view of and use of deception. Chapter IV looks at the
Russian and Soviet mindset and ties the influence of that
mindset to the Soviet proclivity for using deception. The
historical Soviet military application of the art is
examined in the fifth chapter, going all the way back to the
influence of the Mongols and then dwelling on the traumatic
Soviet experience in World War II. Chapters VI and VII deal
respectively with deception's place in Soviet military
doctrine and the organization of the Soviet military to
accommodate the use of deception. In Chapter VIII, Soviet
theory in deception employment (doctrine) is contrasted with
their actual practice of it since World War II.
The ninth and final chapter serves as a conclusion for
the thesis. The main points made throughout the thesis
concerning the role of deception in the Soviet military are
summarized and then briefly contrasted with deception's role
The practical application to which I refer was achieved
during my recent assignment as the Command Tactical
Deception Officer^ from March 1981 to May 1984, at
Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia. My responsibilities included the establishment and
maintenance of a command-wide Tactical Deception Program and
Tactical Deception Officer (TDO) Network (with TDOs assigned
at every organizational level down to the wing). In addition
to real world responsibilities, I gained experience through
the planning and incorporation of deception operations in
numerous military exercises each year, many of which werejoint efforts with the U. S. Army and Navy, South Korea, or
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in the U. S. military. Based on this comparison, the thesis
ends with a discussion of deception's possible role in a
future clash between the Soviet Union and the United States.
B. SCOPE
The preceding overview is sufficient in offering a very
broad view of the major thrust of this thesis, but it is
appropriate to outline in detail the scope of this study
and, more importantly, the rationale behind this approach.
First of all, I have focused my research on military
deception, primarily because this is where my expertise and
interest lie and because it is most appropriate as the
subject of a military thesis. The other most prominent
aspect of deception is that of the political realm. This
would certainly be an interesting and useful study, but so
much of the Soviets' political behavior is based on
deception, or can be misconstrued as deception, that such a
study would easily become bogged down in minute and tedious
detail. The only political deception addressed in this paper
is that which is in support of, or in conjunction with, a
military operation.
Second, military deception can be divided into two very
basic categories: strategic and tactical. While I will spend
some time discussing strategic deception, most of the thesis
deals with tactical deception. Again, this is where my
interest and expertise lie, but more importantly, most
studies on military deception have focused on the strategic
aspect to the virtual exclusion of the tactical.
Consequently, little has ever been written on how deception
is conducted on the battlefield.
Third, I have intentionally refrained from delving very
deeply into deception theory. While the subject of deception
in general has been neglected over time, theory has been one
of its more popular aspects in recent literature. The most
likely reason for this theoretical focus is probably because
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deception, due to little documentation of its use over the
centuries and great need for secrecy when it was employed,
offers fewer cases for study than other elements of warfare.
In short, deception is more easily discussed than
implemented. This is not to speak disparagingly of any
theoretical works on deception, for such works offer a
significant contribution to understanding an art that would
otherwise receive even less attention. I will of course
refer to some theory, but my intent is to provide a more
operational view of deception.
Fourth, this thesis focuses heavily on deception's role
in the Soviet military and touches only briefly on the
U.S. 's view and use of it. This was done for a number of
reasons, the foremost of which is that this paper was
written by a student in a Soviet Studies curriculum. Also,
the Soviets have been more active in recent decades in using
military deception and, quite frankly, offer more cases to
study. The problem of unbalanced information also had a
bearing on this concentration. Far more information was
available on Russian/Soviet deception history and national
mindset than on the same issues concerning the U. S. , while
considerably more organizational and current operational
information was available on the U. S. than on the Soviet
Union. A comparative study of the two nations' use of
deception would be most interesting and appropriate, but
such a study, to do proper justice to the subject, would be
quite lengthy.
Fifth, I have drastically broadened the scope of my
thesis by keeping it unclassified. A considerable amount of
specific information on both the Soviet and U. S. deception
programs is classified, thus forcing an unclassified study
to deal with the subject in fairly general terms.
Finally, very little discussion will be found on the use
of deception in naval operations. This is not because there
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is little such activity; on the contrary, the U. S. Navy
employs deception on virtually a daily basis (mostly in the
form of fleet anti-surveillance tactics directed against
Soviet naval vessels) and probably understands its potential
better than any of the other U. S. military services.
However, a number of fine papers have already been produced
on the subject and I could add very little to what has
already been said. Also, while all the basic principles
apply to deception in any situation, naval deception
involves sufficiently different actions and responses to
warrant a separate study. Therefore, my focus is on
deception operations in air and land warfare.
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II. GENERAL
A. DEFINITION OF DECEPTION AND RELATED TERMS
Deception is an art which transcends the military realm;
in fact, it permeates almost every aspect of any given
society. As such, the basic concept is well known to most
people. Within American society alone, one needs only to
look at the deceptive nature of our games, football and
poker in particular, -and the secrecy and deceptive
maneuvering among much of the business community to realize
how commonplace deception is in our everyday affairs.
Despite this, many U.S. military personnel (and this is
probably true of most other countries) know very little
about the subject, much less how it dovetails with other
military operations. The prerequisite for any such
knowledge, therefore, becomes a thorough understanding of
the definition of deception.
Many definitions of deception abound within American
literature alone. One dictionary defines it as "misleading
by a false appearance or statement; to delude, fool, trick,
defraud, betray; a stratagem, ruse, hoax, subterfuge.
"
Roqet ' s Thesaurus continues with the following synonyms:
"willful misconception, illusion, dupery, bluffing,
misinformation, artifice, feint, masquerade, decoy,
beguile. " Another source puts it this way: "Deception is a
conscious and rational effort deliberately to mislead an
opponent. It seeks to create in the adversary a state of
mind which will be conducive to exploitation by the deceiver
CRef. 2: p. 13." And yet another source defines deception
more succinctly as "the deliberate misrepresentation of
reality done to gain a competitive advantage CRef. 3: p.
5]."
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So far, the definitions have been broad in scope and can
be applied to deception used in any situation, military or
otherwise. Focusing now on the military aspect, one author
offers the following description:
Deception in war is the art of misleading the enemy into
doing something, or not doing something, so that his
strategic or tactical position will be weakened ....
A deceptive operation embodies all the signs of a real
assault. It makes the enemy believe that pretended
hostile activities are genuine. It induces a false sense
of danger in one area, forcing him to strengthen his
defences there, and therefore to weaken them somewhere
else where the real attack is due. CRef . 4; p. xi]
To sum up these definitions, one can say that military
deception is the act of convincing an enemy commander and
his staff (or at least offering compelling evidence) that a
piece of information is something other than what it
actually is. The goal in using military deception is always
to cause the enemy to act, or fail to act, in a manner
detrimental to his wellbeing and beneficial to the deceiver.
There are a number of terms related to deception which
should be addressed here. These related terms are "cover,
camouflage, lying, and artifice," all sometimes confused
with, or substituted for the word "deception. " Drs. Donald
Daniel and Katherine Herbig, in their portion of a study
entitled Multidisciplinarv Perspectives on Military
Deception , subordinate these concepts to deception and
graphically depict the relationships as shown in Figure 2.
1
CRef. 3: p. 73.
Cover is the aspect of deception which involves
withholding information, and includes camouflage; it is the
security side of deception and is therefore its very core or
center. Cover is fundamental to any deception because a
deceiver is always trying to hide or protect something.
Lying encompasses cover because it always involves
withholding some information. However, in addition to this.
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a liar tries to divert attention away from the truth, a more
active measure than simply withholding information. Lying
and artifice are very similar but differ in the fact that
lying involves a simple untrue statement while artifice
involves "manipulating the context surrounding the statement
in order to enhance its veracity. " Deception encompasses
all of these concepts and a little more. While the three
subsidiary concepts concentrate on only one side of the
deceiver-audience interaction, deception encompasses the
reactions of the audience to the lies. To summarize this
relationship between deception and its subsidiary concepts:
Someone whose false tale is not believed is still a
liar, but he has not deceived. One does not fail at
lying because the audience is not convinced, but one
does fail at deception if the audience does not believe
the lie. CRef. 3: pp. 6-83
Figure 2. 1 Relationship of Deception to Related Terms.
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In addition to these fundamental concepts, deception can
be viewed in terms of the means available to implement a
deception. These are the methods or measures which a
deception planner actually uses to satisfy the objectives of
his plan. Deception means can be divided into three basic
categories: 1) physical, 2) technical, and
3) administrative.
Generally speaking, physical means are those which the
enemy detects unaided with one or more of his five senses.
One exception to the lanaided criterion would be detection
through optical sensors. One of the most common elements of
this category is maneuver deception; in other words, the
maneuvering or placement of troops, equipment, vehicles,
aircraft, etc. , in such a manner as to mislead the enemy
concerning one's true intentions. Under this subcategory
fall feints and demonstrations. Feints generally involve
committing at least a small portion of one's forces in an
area removed from the primary axis of attack in hopes of
causing the enemy to shift a larger portion of his forces
away from that primary axis. Demonstrations are very
similar to feints except that they usually are not meant to
involve direct contact with the enemy, as is the case with
feints. Decoys or dummies also fall under this category,
including such things as inflatable aircraft, cardboard or
plywood tanks, etc. Sonic and olfactory deception generally
involve, respectively, the amplification of recorded vehicle
and equipment sounds such as tanks, helicopters, etc. , and
the production of bogus smells such as cooking fires, diesel
fumes, cordite, etc. , to supplement other false indicators.
One last element of this category is camouflage and all its
attendant methods. This includes not only the well-known
camouflage netting used to conceal objects, but also the use
of natural terrain features and vegetation.
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Technical means form a category which has been available
to deception planners for only a few decades. The two basic
elements within this category are electronic in nature:
communications deception and all other electronic means
(usually radar deception). Each of these two subcategories
can then be divided once more into their imitative and
manipulative aspects. Imitative communications or
electronic deception involves the active intrusion into an
enemy channel or frequency and imitation of whatever form of
communication is passing over that line or net.
Manipulative deception is when the deceiver manipulates his
own communications or other electronic signal and passes
false information, with the assumption that the enemy is
intercepting that particular signal. Under a third minor
subcategory of technical means would fall such exotic means
as nuclear, biological, or chemical traces, used perhaps to
simulate a "special weapons" leak. These means are
admittedly somewhat outlandish, but their future use is not
unthinkable.
Administrative means involve any kind of paperwork or
public declarations by the military which are intended to
mislead enemy agents. These can include such things as
bogus flight schedules posted in open areas, publication of
false orders, misleading press statements, etc. In most
cases, this type of deception is targeted at enemy
decisionmakers through agents that have been placed in
positions allowing them to observe our activities; for
example: cleaning ladies, cooks, or any other indigenous
laborers. Such people would of course be more prevalent on
established, permanent military installations like air
bases, but army units in the field can also be vulnerable to
scrutiny by agents and should take this into consideration
during the development of a deception plan. CRef . 5 3
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In studying military deception, it becomes apparent that
its employment does not entail a simple application of one
or two measures. Deception has many faces, each a different
shade, each possessing a different character. Whereas one
means of deception may be appropriate in one situation, that
same method is not necessarily applicable in another. In
other words, there is no set list of ingredients which can
be formed into a "recipe for the use of deception" and then
used in any scenario. There are several variants of
deception (not to be confused with categories of means),
each more applicable to certain scenarios. However, for
ease of understanding, I will discuss in detail only two
very basic variants: 1) the distracting variant, and 2) the
disguising variant.
The distracting variant seeks to draw the opponent's
attention away from the activity or location being
protected. This can be accomplished through many means:
establishing dummy positions or equipment in areas where the
deceiver has little or no interest; conducting feints or
demonstrations in those same areas with small numbers of
troops and equipment; or by leaking false intelligence to
give the opponent indications that the deceiver's interest
is in another area far removed from where his true interest
lies, to name only a few.
The disguising variant does not seek to divert the
opponent's attention but, instead, hides or disguises that
which is being protected by making it appear to the opponent
as something other than what it actually is. This can be
done by simple camouflaging, creation of false damage (bomb
craters, artillery damage, etc. ) to give the indication of
inactivity, erection of dummy buildings or equipment to
change the "apparent" mission of the unit being protected,
and many more. It should be stressed at this point that any
use of the disguising variant must go hand in hand with
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basic security measures. This does not mean that security is
synonymous with deception; on the contrary, good security
can and does stand alone at times. But since any employment
of deception, especially the disguising variant, always
involves hiding something from enemy intelligence, effective
application of security measures is therefore crucial to
success in deception.
In order to better illustrate the nature of military
deception, the following paragraphs will offer a
hypothetical scenario in which deception is employed. The
scope in this case is broad enough to allow the use of
deception by either a ground commander or air commander. As
reinforcement for the previous explanation of deception
variants, both variants will be applied in this scenario.
1. Hypothetical Scenario
A military commander is faced with a choice between
two avenues of approach for attacking or counterattacking
the enemy. For the ground commander, this could mean two
bridges or likely fording spots along a river, two valleys
through which his units must traverse, etc. ; for the air
commander, it could be two "safe" air corridors into the
enemy's rear, opened through attrition of the enemy's air
defense in these areas. In either case, the commander could
divide his forces and attack along both avenues, but
manpower and equipment are limited, and besides, it violates
the principles and advantages of mass and concentration.
Therefore, a choice must be made between Avenue A or B; in
this case, the commander chooses A.
However, now that the choice has been made, there is
still the likelihood of the enemy detecting the
concentration of troops or air power opposite Avenue A and
responding with a corresponding buildup of his own to repel
the attack. Good security limits some of the indications of
massing, but never all of them. Our commander has therefore
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decided to make the enemy believe that the attack will come
along Avenue B, hoping to cause a concentration of enemy
defenses opposite B and away from A.
a. Use of the Distracting Deception Variant
Our commander has many means available to divert
the enemy's attention away from the buildup opposite Avenue
A. The ground commander may choose to employ some or all of
the following means (dependent upon available resources):
demonstrations and feints by small numbers of troops in the
vicinity of B; amplification of recorded sounds, such as
tanks, trucks, bulldozers, helicopters, etc. ; campfires and
lights; bogus reconnaissance flights and other air activity
such as close air support (CAS) and battlefield air
interdiction ( BAI ) over Avenue B; and many more. The air
commander, also probably operating under resource
constraints, may develop or "activate" dummy or auxiliary
airfields in vicinity of B. This would have to be supported
by believable dummy equipment on the airfields and some
actual air activity over them such as simulated landing
patterns or the "apparent" launching of attack aircraft
conducting feints toward Avenue B. Both commanders could
also use technical and administrative means to divert the
enemy's attention, such as intentional communications leaks
showing interest and activity in area B, selective and
intermittent jamming of enemy electronic sensors opposite
area B to give the impression that something important is
being hidden there, and publication and open dissemination
of orders indicating significant troop and equipment
movement to area B. In summary, it should be stressed that
all these deception means are designed to draw the enemy'
s
attention away from Avenue A where our actual interest lies,
causing him to concentrate on Avenue B.
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b. Use of the Disguising Deception Variant
In protecting and hiding our buildup opposite
Avenue A, the commander has another list of means available
to him. Many of these means are identical to those employed
under the distracting variant, but they now serve the
purpose of disguising the buildup in area A instead of
diverting attention away from it. Camouflage is the
fundamental element in this case, simply hiding the bulk of
our buildup from enemy optical sensors, to include the human
eye. This entails not only the use of man-made camouflage
netting and other such material, but also the judicious use
of natural terrain features and vegetation, such as
haystacks in which to hide artillery pieces or large trees
which hide taxiways or heavy traffic areas. The air
commander may order that false bomb craters be painted on
the runways of airfields in area A and damaged or destroyed
aircraft placed in plain sight. Air activity over these
fields should be held to a minimum, with flight patterns
established in another area ( ideally over airfields in area
B if close enough). Again, it should be emphasized that all
these deceptive means must be complemented by good security
measures since the objective of this deception variant is to
make the enemy believe that any indication of the presence
of our forces in area A is not worthy of his concern; and
the fewer the indications of that presence the better.
The two variants of deception outlined and
illustrated above are certainly not the only way of viewing
deception. Daniel and Herbig also identify two basic
variants which, except for a few similarities, are different
from those just listed. The first one they call the
ambiguity- increasing or A-type variant. In their words, it
"seeks to compound the uncertainties confronting any state's
attempt to determine its adversary's wartime intentions." In
other words, the A-type attempts to confuse a target to the
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point where he is not sure what to believe and therefore
increases his risk of making a bad decision. This variant
shares at least one similarity with the disguising variant
in that neither one seeks to divert the target's attention
away from that being protected.
The second variant Daniel and Herbig call the
misleading or M-type. This one "reduces ambiguity by
building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative. " A
strong similarity can be seen between the M-type and
distracting variants since both are intended to focus the
target's attention away from the protected object or
activity. CRef. 3: pp. 8-10 3
B. HISTORICAL LOOK AT DECEPTION
Despite the fact that the martial application of
deception has been neglected at times throughout history,
considerable evidence exists that deception is a very old
tool of warfare. One of the earliest examples of military
deception can be found in Homer's epic The Iliad , dating
back to the eighth century B. C. The story chronicles a long
Greek siege on the walled city of Troy. Frustrated after
years of stalemate, the Greeks built a huge wooden horse,
secreted several soldiers inside, gave the horse to the
Trojans as a gift, and then acted as if preparing to depart.
That night, after the horse had been accepted by the Trojans
and taken into the city, and after most of the Trojan
citizens were asleep, the Greeks inside the horse climbed
out, overcame the Trojan guards, and opened the city gates
for the rest of the Greek army, thus successfully ending the
long campaign. This deceptive aspect of the tale has, of
course, become known as the "Trojan Horse," well-known to
most people. Many would correctly argue that the story is
apparently a work of mythology ( since several Greek
mythological figures are mentioned) and that the siege as
told by Homer probably never took place. However, the
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important point to be made here is that the use of deception
to aid in satisfying a military objective was evidently
considered as far back as 700 B. C.
One of the earliest known writers who consistently dealt
with the subject of deception (and many other elements of
warfare) was the Chinese sage and military strategist Sun
Tzu who lived in the sixth century B. C. A compilation of
most of his works and sayings was developed into a book
entitled The Art of War, in which he offered military and
political advice, most of it still applicable today.
Although Sun Tzu made several references to the use of
deception, one in particular stands out and is frequently
quoted by contemporary scholars, military leaders, and
politicians:
All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to
attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we
must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the
enemy believe that we are away; when far away, we must
make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice
the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. CRef . 6: p.
11]
The sophisticated nature of this quote is surprising when
one realizes it was written about 2,500 years ago.
Obviously, deception had been developed by that time into a
fundamental element of warfare, at least in part of the
world.
Specific battles and campaigns in which deception was
used can be found among many of the countless wars fought
throughout history. As mentioned in the introduction, some
nations or states were particularly adroit in its use and
employed it quite often; others rarely considered it, if
ever. One group of people which stands out as one of the
most prolific and successful wielders of military deception
is the Mongols. Although their empire remained fairly intact
over several centuries, they are best known for their
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invasion of Russia beginning in 1241 A. D. Ever since Liddell
Hart's treatment of the Mongols in his book The Great
Captains , published in 1927, many military historians and
scholars have become interested in the Mongol method of
warfare, deception included. As will be addressed in more
detail in Chapter V, it is now believed that the Mongol
invasion of Russia heavily influenced Russian, and even
Soviet military strategy and tactics.
1. Overlord: A Classic Example
Since a detailed historical treatment of the
application of military deception in general would be rather
involved and lengthy, and since it is not within the purview
of this thesis, I jump forward in time now to recount only
one historical example of a successful deception plan.
( Soviet historical use of deception will be addressed in
depth in Chapter V. ) The plan I chose was called Bodyguard,
the deception which covered the Allied invasion of Normandy
in 1944, known as Operation Overlord, Although this
deception was of a strategic nature and supported an
operation of major proportions, it serves as an excellent
example of a comprehensive deception plan. It incorporated
most of the planning principles outlined in the next section
and, most importantly, it was highly successful.
Bodyguard was a plan which encompassed many
subsidiary deception plans. The overall objective was to
cause the Germans to deploy and/or maintain sufficient
troops awav from the Normandy beach area in France so as to
ensure the minimum resistance possible for the planned
Allied invasion in that area (planned for May 1944 but
delayed until 6 June 1944). The primary method in achieving
this objective was to provide invasion threats in other
plausible areas, such as Norway, various parts of France,
Italy, and the Balkans. The threats to southern France,
Italy, and the Balkans proved to be fairly ineffective, but
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those to Norway and especially northern France were highly
successful and contributed greatly to the success of the
actual invasion.
The subsidiary plan which posed a notional threat to
Norway was known as Graffham and was more political in
nature than the others. To be sure, there were other plans
which provided false indications of troop concentrations
suitable for an invasion of Norway, but Graffham was
probably far more effective. The plan essentially called for
the visit of a high-ranking British officer to the Swedish
Air Force (the SAF was considered pro-Ally while the Swedish
Army was still pro-German). The British chose Air
Vice-Marshal Thornton who advised the Swedish commander that
in the event of an Allied invasion of Norway, the Germans
would most likely withdraw, murdering prisoners and
destroying important facilities in the process. He then
asked for Swedish help in preventing the slaughter and
destruction. The Swedish commander was impressed but refused
to commit himself. His answer, however, was immaterial since
it turned out that the Germans had bugged the office where
the conversation took place. Hitler himself received the
transcript of the conversation within three hours and
promptly ordered two divisions to Norway as reinforcement,
thus misallocating 30,000 more troops that could have been
used later at Normandy. CRef . 7: pp. 176-79 3
In support of Graffham» the Bank of England bought
thousands of pounds worth of Norwegian government bonds
which were at a very low price at that particular time. This
not only proved to be a wise investment but also provided a
strong indicator to the Germans that the British intended to
reoccupy Norway in the near future.
In the words of one historian. Plan Fortitude South
i
which embodied the notional threat to northern France, was
"the largest, most elaborate, most carefully planned, most
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vital, and most successful of all the Allied deception
operations. " It too was a subsidiary plan of Bodyguard in
its support of the Allied invasion of Normandy. Fortitude
South ^Fortitude North was the notional threat to Norway
under which Graffham fell) was itself divided into six
elements code-named Quicksilver I-VI
.
Quicksilver I was the deception which indicated that
the main Allied invasion of the European continent would be
directed at Pas de Calais, France, several weeks after the
Normandy landings. Pas de Calais is about 150 miles
northeast of the Normandy beaches and is the section of
French coast closest to England. As such, it was a logical
target for the Allied assault. To pose the notional threat,
the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), activated in
southeastern England (opposite Pas de Calais) in October
1943, was portrayed as the parent unit for all units
targeted at Pas de Calais, and General Patton was identified
as its commander. As the real elements of FUSAG were
transferred to southwestern England for the actual buildup,
or to France after the invasion ( as Patton was with his
Third U.S. Army), fake units and dummy equipment were moved
in their place to maintain the FUSAG threat to Pas de
Calais. The dummy equipment collected and assembled for this
task stands as one of the largest notional equipment
concentrations known.
Quicksilver II consisted of the radio deception in
support of the FUSAG buildup. This involved extensive
communications networks manned by only a few personnel
conducting the appropriate routine radio chatter expected in
a buildup of that magnitude. Quicksilver III was the
portrayal of a large concentration of landing craft in
harbor areas suitable for launching an invasion to Pas de
Calais. There were only about four actual landing craft
used, but by overtly moving them by day, then returning them
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by night to their point of origin so that they could then
make another overt transfer the next day, a concentration of
about 250 landing craft was portrayed. Quicksilver IV and V
involved, respectively, bombing the beaches of Pas de Calais
and bombing German lines of communication in the region.
This was important to demonstrate an Allied interest in Pas
de Calais and to indicate that an invasion there was
imminent. Quicksilver VI was the deceptive lighting program
and involved the portrayal of large troop and equipment
concentrations at night through the erection of elaborate
lighting schemes. At the same time, great care was taken to
ensure that lighting in the area of the actual buildup was
as subdued as possible. CRef . ^: pp. 177-8^]
Although some elements of Fortitude South were not
judged to be very successful (mainly because it was believed
the Germans did not observe some of the deceptions), the
overall effect had what can only be considered a decisive
influence on the success of Operation Overlord. At the time
of the invasion on 6 June, approximately 22 German divisions
were located in the Pas de Calais area, representing the
major portion of the German Fifteenth Army. By mid-July, 30
Allied divisions had landed in France, but the Germans still
maintained the 22 divisions in Pas de Calais. CRef. ^: p.
189] The reason for this was that General von Rundstedt, the
German Commander-in-Chief in the West, remained convinced
for six weeks after the Normandy invasion that Normandy was
only a diversionary operation, admittedly in great strength,
and that the main assault was still yet to come in the Pas
de Calais area. When it finally became clear that no such
assault was forthcoming, it was too late for the 22
-3
The Israelis conducted an almost identical deception in
preparation for their surprise attack on Egypt in 1967. By
moving only a very few landing craft up and down the Gulf of
Aqaba in much the same manner as the British during World
War II. they succeeded in drawing off a sizable Egyptian
force to deal with the phantom Israeli force.
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divisions to aid in turning the Allied tide. In short, it is
no exaggeration to assign great importance to the deception
plan Bodyguard in its support of the Normandy invasion.
Without it, it is quite likely the Germans would have
repulsed the assault landings, thus postponing a successful
invasion for as much as a year. Such a delay could have
changed the political alignment of Europe as it is known
today by allowing the Soviets to "liberate" more of western
Europe.
In concluding this section on deception in history,
it is important to point out that the art has not been
completely ignored since World War II. The British appear to
have retained their interest and skill in deception, evident
in their use of it to support the landing of the Royal
Marines on the Falkland Islands in 1982. The Argentines also
made use of deception during that conflict by portraying
fake bomb damage on the runway at Port Stanley. The many
Israeli-Arab conflicts over the years have offered several
examples of successful deception. The 1967 war probably
provides the richest examples, all on the part of Israel in
preparation for its surprise attacks on Egypt, Jordan, and
Syria. Apparently having learned the value of surprise and
deception's potential contribution to its achievement, Egypt
made good use of it in 1973 by "conditioning" Israel through
several military mobilizations. Israel once again decided
on the use of deception in 1982 which resulted in the
destruction of all the Syrian SA-6 sites located at that
time in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Even the U. S.
,
generally one of the worst offenders in ignoring the
employment of deception, has found a few occasions since
World War II in which deception could play a role, most
notably in Vietnam. Therefore, although the art of deception
has generally been neglected over time, it is by no means a
dead art. As long as Israel, Britain, the Soviet Union, and
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other such states continue to demonstrate the value of
effective deception in their military conflicts and
interventions, perhaps those other states which
traditionally omit the art from their military plans will
eventually see the merit in its inclusion.
C. BASIC DECEPTION PRINCIPLES
The final section in this chapter addresses six
principles which are fundamental, and therefore crucial, to
the planning and successful execution of military deception.
Although more than si-x principles can be applied in
deception planning, I have chosen only the most important.
Every assertion made in this section can be backed up with
considerable and sometimes painful experience. Many points
made will seem so fundamental as to be elementary; however,
as I discovered in many instances, a deception planner
cannot rely on the probability that a particular step in the
deception planning process is as obvious to the many with
whom he must consult along the way. This especially includes
the commander, who must provide final approval to any
deception plan. One may ask at this point how a section on
deception planning principles applies to a focused study of
the role deception plays in the Soviet military. The answer
is that these basic principles must be applied by any agency
wishing to employ military deception successfully, including
the Soviet Union. Therefore we can see that the Soviets
must approach the subject in much the same manner as anyone
else. The difference, as it turns out, is the style in
which they employ the art and the degree of confidence they
display in its potential.
1. Applicability
The first and foremost principle in planning
deception is that a deception plan must support an
operations plan. In other words, deception should not be
employed for its own sake, in a vacuum so to speak; it
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should have a clear and distinct objective which dovetails
with, and directly supports, the objective(s) of a standard
operation. A deception plan by itself serves no purpose
other than to alert the enemy to the fact that he is a
target for deception, thus making future attempts on the
deceiver's part more likely to be detected.
Two types of commander are guilty of this mistake:
the one who is enamored with the mysterious and exotic
nature of deception, but knows little about it and simply
wants to use it; and the one who has been ordered by his
superiors to incorporate deception into his standard
operations and therefore uses it only to "fill the square.
"
Despite any external pressure, if a commander does not want
to use deception, it is unlikely to be employed effectively,
regardless of the skill of the deception planner.
2. Plausibility
A deception plan must be plausible if it is to have
any hope of being believed by the enemy. The planner must
ensure that what he is portraying correlates with what the
enemy believes he is capable of doing. Simple mistakes, such
as conducting a notional buildup too quickly in relation to
the deceiver's actual supply and transportation
capabilities, or portraying a notional threat in an area
where such a threat is obviously impossible (due to terrain
features, for example) can totally discredit a deception
plan.
A planner does, however, have a good source of
deception "ideas" at his disposal which are very likely to
be plausible. Most major military operations will have one
or more elements which offer multiple courses of action ( for
example: location of an assault landing). Once a course has
been chosen, the deception planner can then use one or more
of the discarded courses as the focus of his deception. The
Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 offers a striking
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example of this. The Allies chose Normandy as the site for
the landings over several other alternates. Pas de Calais
among them. Once Normandy was identified as the target, the
deception planners had many other locations to which they
could direct their notional threats. As it turned out, they
used virtually all of the alternate locations. Since all
alternate courses of action are worthy of consideration at
one point, they stand a good chance of being sufficiently
plausible as a deception plan ( assuming the planner makes
necessary adjustments in the deception if the alternate
course was originally discarded for a glaring fault).
3. Detectability
It should be remembered that every deception plan
plays to an audience; if that audience does not observe the
deceptive actions, then there was no deception. Therefore, a
planner must ensure that his deception plan is "detectable"
by the enemy; that it plays into his various intelligence
sensors. A hundred years ago and longer, those sensors were
essentially only human eyeballs; then came the balloon as an
observation platform and, along with it, aerial photography.
With the advent of the aircraft, commanders were able to
look deeper into the enemy's territory. Coincidental with
development of airborne platforms was the development of
electronic equipment, first radio communications and later
radar, infrared, and other sophisticated detection devices.
Now all these sensors can be used both on the ground and in
the air, making it possible for a commander to observe the
battlefield through a host of sensors, some offering an
almost real-time picture of the situation. This development
of sensor technology to such an advanced state poses some
interesting problems to a deception planner. Generally
speaking, he can view the current sensor "state-of-the-art"
from two perspectives: the more pessimistic view, which
asserts that there are too many sensors to make deception a
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feasible option for commanders anymore, and the optimistic
view, which sees a multi-sensor array as that many more
channels through which to feed deceptive information to the
enemy. I tend to lean toward the optimistic view while many
of my military intelligence colleagues and some senior
officers adhere to the more pessimistic view. Certainly,
there is some middle ground here; a good deception planner
would be one who tempers an optimistic approach with the
realization that all those sensors make a deception plan
riskier.
An extremely important point should be made here
which ties in very closely with the optimistic view just
mentioned: the more enemy sensors a deception planner
targets, the more likely the enemy will believe the
deception. If the enemy receives deceptive inputs through
one sensor, say a voice communications channel, but then
receives no corroborating evidence through other channels,
say radar, infrared, or photography, then he will probably
suspect the one input he did receive, or perhaps dismiss it
altogether as inconsequential. If, however, he receives
indications of a certain activity on the deceiver's part
from several sensors, he is very likely to swallow the bait
being fed him. This point cannot be stressed too much; too
often a deception plan is basically sound except for the
fact that the enemy is provided with too few indicators, so
the plan fails miserably. Both the British and the Soviets
in World War II understood very well this fundamental
principle, and they were rewarded for it.
4. Feasibility
This is one of those simple principles which should
be painfully obvious but, unfortunately, is often
overlooked. A deception plan must be feasible to execute.
This involves determining such basic issues as whether there
is enough equipment available to execute the deception
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(radio sets, jeeps, trucks, decoys, etc. ), or whether the
deception will draw off troops and equipment from another
operation which cannot spare them. In this age of
specialization, commanders must often rely on the advice of
specialists, and deception is sometimes one of those areas
with which a commander is unfamiliar. More than once I have
seen a deception plan developed, approved by the commander,
and then halfway through its execution it is discovered that
not enough resources are available to complete it. This
generally results not only in exposure of the deception
plan, but sometimes even jeopardizes the main supported
operation. A planner must accept the responsibility of
researching the availability of resources and informing the
commander of same, while the commander must realize that
every deception will cost something; deception is never
free.
5. Timing
Timing is a crucial element of any operation, but it
is especially important to a deception operation since it
must be executed in relation to not only the enemy's
activities (reconnaissance in particular) but also to the
main operation it is supporting. For this reason, it is wise
to keep the deception planner informed of any changes to, or
major developments in, the main operation, thereby giving
him sufficient time to adjust the deception accordingly. The
specific time a deception plan, or any of its elements for
that matter, is implemented often determines whether it is
successful or not. As an example, in one exercise recently,
the goal of our deception cell was to indicate an armored
buildup in the southern sector, hoping to draw off some of
the enemy's armor in the north where our counterattack was
to occur. We provided the enemy with considerable evidence
of a southern buildup and, as we found out later, succeeded
in convincing him to the point where he dispatched an armor
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unit to the south. However, he received the indications we
were feeding him too late because our counterattack
commenced before the armor unit actually got underway. Our
tanks therefore had to confront the enemy's full armor
contingent. The lesson we learned was that the enemy must be
given sufficient time to collect, analyze, and react to the
deceptive information he is being fed.
6. Security
Although addressed last here, security is certainly
not the least important element to consider in planning
deception. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, every
deception operation assumes some real operation or location
is to be hidden and protected. Therefore, it is correct to
say that security and deception go hand in hand; while
deception distracts the enemy's attention away from the main
operation or disguises it as something else, security hides
the main operation. In other words, deception provides false
indicators while security suppresses indicators. Also, it is
true that security can stand alone, that an operation's
indicators can simply be suppressed instead of altered or
disguised; but deception generally cannot succeed without
good security measures applied to the main operation. One
exception to this would be Daniel's and Herbig's A-type, or
ambiguity increasing deception which seeks to confuse the
enemy by providing as many indicators as possible. In some
such cases, it may not be as crucial to hide the true
location of the main operation.
Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy in
1944, is a good example of this. Although the buildup in
southwest England was hidden as much as possible, the
indications that Normandy would be the location of some kind
of assault were not completely suppressed. The Germans were
fairly certain Normandy would be the site for an Allied
diversionary assault, with the main assault coming at Pas de
Calais.
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Security applies not only to suppression of
indicators visible to the enemy but also to the restriction
of common knowledge of a deception plan among friendly
troops. While this may be true for any operation, the exotic
nature of deception tends to pique people's curiosity and
generate gossip more than standard operations. With this in
mind, it is wise to limit exposure of a deception plan to
only those personnel directly involved in its approval and
execution.
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III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SOVIET DECEPTION
In looking at Soviet military history, it is readily
apparent that such history reaches back only a few decades
and that Soviet military experience in wartime is
essentially limited to their four years of participation in
World War II from 1941 until 1945. Of course, since their
military intervention into Afghanistan in 1979, one could
argue that they are now building on that otherwise scanty
experience; but it could also be argued that the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan is providing them with little or no
experience in conventional warfare, since most of their
effort is expended pursuing the elusive but deadly
Mujahedeerir or Afghan resistance fighters. The "war" in
Afghanistan, therefore, is a guerilla or unconventional war,
and it offers few opportunities to fully test Soviet skills
and equipment needed to fight a major conventional war
against an opponent like the United States.
This is not meant to belittle the Soviet experience in
World War II; their contribution in defeating Germany was
indeed of major proportion, and the Soviets would say they
alone made that defeat possible. Without getting into an
argument on that last point, it is no exaggeration to say
that the Soviet experience in World War II was significant
and that it transformed an army with almost no combat
experience, decimated by Stalin's purges, into an armed
force which has now become one of the two most powerful
militaries in the world. World War II, more than any other
event in the almost seventy years since the Russian
Revolution, has made an indelible imprint on the Soviet
psyche. Even today, forty years after the war, the Soviet
people and the rest of the world are constantly reminded of
the sacrifice the Soviet Union made. This constant reminder.
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plus the fact that the military has no major combat
experience to draw from except World War II, means that the
Soviet military bases its approach to modern conventional
warfare almost exclusively on its World War II experience.
Of course, this also means that the Soviet approach to
military deception is based on the same experience.
With all this in mind, it is only logical for a study of
Soviet military deception to take a close look at how the
Soviets employed it in World War II. However, although
Soviet combat experience is extremely limited, we do have
three cases to study since the war in which the Soviets
employed some form of deception: their military
interventions into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1958),
and Afghanistan (1979). Each of these three cases provides a
slightly different example of Soviet-style deception, but
they are examples nevertheless; examples which give us an
idea of what role deception plays in the Soviet military and
how it is likely to be used.
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IV. SOVIET MINDSET: PROCLIVITY FOR DECEPTION?
The degree of skill a certain group possesses in
employing deception is dependent in part on the group's
psychological make-up; specifically, on its historical
proclivity for using deception in certain situations. Many
factors have a bearing on this proclivity, but by far the
most prominent is a state's perceived need for security; is
it constantly threatened, or does it feel threatened? If
such is the case, the state is likely to increase its
security measures to the degree it feels the threat is
sufficiently neutralized. Common among such states which
maintain high security is the practice of deceiving one's
opponents in order to dilute or distract the threatening
force. Israel is a good example of this. Constantly
threatened by its surrounding Arab neighbors, Israel has
become one of the most skillful employers of the art.
Although this has not always been the case in Israeli-Arab
diplomatic relations, it has become the norm for the
frequent military clashes in that region. Deception has
played an important, even crucial, role in the more recent
of these clashes.
Certainly another very applicable state in this case is
the Soviet Union. Richard Pipes, in his book entitled
Survival is Not Enough points out that after the Turks
overran Byzantium in 1453, Russia was left as the only state
I use the term Soviet Union here because that is the
name of the state in question. What I actually mean ( not
only in this particular instance but also in many future
references to the Soviet Union in this chapter) is the
Russian nation, which still lives on but now with a
different name and somewhat ethnically diluted. However, the
Russians still form over fifty percent of the Soviet
population^ they fill the majority of government positions
and. most importantly, it is essentially only Russian
history that is recognized by the Soviets before the
revolution in 1917 and which we are interested in at this
time.
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professing Orthodox Christianity. This turn of events
tended to produce in Russians a besieged mentality and a
feeling of isolation. CRef . 8: p. 18] Pipes also offers his
strong opinion that Russian aggression is not a defensive
reflex. It has become popular among many students of Soviet
political culture to state that Russian expansionism is a
result of the paranoia caused by repeated invasions of
Russia over the centuries. In actuality, as Pipes asserts,
Russia has been the invader far more than it has been the
one invaded. CRef. 8: p. 38] But one very important point
overrides this last point: the Soviets (and before them the
Russians) neve-rtheless perceive themselves as being under
siege. Today, this transcends the military and political
realms and reaches into the realm of ideology. Therefore,
for the purpose of determining the Soviet proclivity for
deception, it does not matter so much what actually happened
in the past, but instead, how events in the past have
contributed to the formation of current Soviet perceptions.
There are several aspects of Russian history which help
explain the present Soviet penchant for deception. The first
is the development of modern Russian/Soviet society based on
the evolution of the Russian peasant village hundreds of
years ago ( called "Mir" which means both "world" and "peace"
in Russian). The Mirs were the lowest unit of society as
Russia was in the process of developing into a nation. Each
Mir was essentially a self-contained, separate entity, a
condition which soon led to distrust of the outside world,
paranoia, and xenophobia. Strangers were never welcome and
the order of the day was secrecy. A natural outgrowth of
this secrecy was the use of deception in everyday affairs
(particularly in the rare instances trade was conducted with
the outside) in order to protect themselves from any
perceived threat. A crude system of government eventually
appeared in the form of leadership by the village elders.
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This group of men epitomized the overall personality of the
Mir: secretive, deceptive, and autocratic. One of the elders
would eventually emerge as the most influential and become
the village spokesman and mediator with the outside world.
Again, his most common means for protecting his village were
secrecy and deception.
As Russia continued its development into a nation, a
"Princely Court" was formed with the Grand Prince
(eventually called "Czar") living in Moscow. This court was
the result of the upper class merging into clans; each clan
had a leader (prince) who lived in the Kremlin with the
Grand Prince (hence the Princely Court). Just as with the
Mir, the Princely Court was autocratic, oligarchic,
secretive, and deceptive. Contact with the outside world was
avoided and any visitors (such as foreign ambassadors) were
kept in plush captivity, not allowed to see how Russian
royalty lived.
Looking at the current Soviet government, one can easily
see the ancestral ties. Just as their predecessors, the
Soviet leaders are autocratic, oligarchic, . secretive, and
deceptive. The outside world (with rare exceptions) is
forbidden to see the inner workings of Soviet bureaucracy.
Deception is used almost habitually in all realms of Soviet
behavior, be it political, ideological, economic, or
military, to protect them from any perceived threat.
CRef. 93
Reinforcing, and perhaps supplanting, the besieged
mentality of Orthodox Christianity days, the Soviets now
perceive themselves as the only bastion of true socialism.
Realizing that the state of true communism cannot be
achieved until all capitalist threats are removed, the
Soviets continue to emphasize the external threat, using it
as some of the justification for a secretive society and
often aggressive behavior. Whether justified or not.
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westerners must realize that the result of all this paranoia
and xenophobia is a Soviet personality to which secrecy and
deception are common tools.
In observing Soviet behavior, one can get the impression
that deception has become a Soviet way of life not only in
relation to the outside world but also in everyday
intra-Soviet relations. One source, in discussing the
infallibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
describes a process known as "double think" which he feels
is used by many individual Soviets:
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory
beliefs in one s mind at the same time, and accepting
both of them . . . the essential act of the Party is to
use conscious deception while retaining the firmness of
?urpose that goes with complete honesty ... to deny
he existence of objective reality and all the while
take account of the reality one denies ....
CRef. 10: p. 28]
One can see, therefore, that the Soviet system encourages,
albeit unconsciously, the development of a proclivity for
deception in the Soviet citizen. This proclivity is
reinforced everyday by the very nature of the system. Dr.
Wilhelm Starlinger, a former prisoner of the Soviets,
describes how the practice of deception by means of altered
public figures (numerical) has permeated the entire Soviet
system:
Former workers in the apparatus of the Central Committee
and old Party members said to me over and over again:
Never believe any figure that is published. Everyone is
either false or correct depending on whether truth or
falsehood happens to meet the needs of the moment.
Fundamentally, everything in our country that involves
figures is outright manipulation, intended to mystify!
"
CRef. 11: p. 32]
Ronald Hingley, in his book entitled The Russian Mind
delves deeper into the Russian/Soviet mentality and
identifies two forms of Russian deception, or lying:
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"vranyo" and "lozh. " "Vranyo" is defined as "lies, fibbing,
nonsense, or rot," a relatively harmless trait of
storytelling present in most societies, not just in Russia.
"Lozh, " on the other hand, is the much more serious habit of
lying to cover something up, and appears to be more common
in the Russian culture than in most others. CRef . 12: p. 90]
The Marquis de Custine, a visitor of Russia in 1839,
describes this Russian trait as "a dexterity in lying, an
aptitude for the bogus so effective that it affronts my
integrity CRef. 12: pp. 105-106]."
The picture one gets of the Soviet mentality, therefore,
is of a character which embraces lying and deceit. Of
course, this is a harsh description and we should not
believe that all Soviet citizens do nothing but lie and
deceive. But we should realize that because of his Russian
heritage, a Soviet finds it easier to use these tools than
does the average citizen of most other nations. And in as
much as a nation's armed forces are a microcosm of the
society in general, the Soviet military has inherited the
Russian proclivity for deception. Whether and how the Soviet
military has institutionalized this proclivity, so that it
can be employed in a consistent and efficient manner, is the
subject of the remaining chapters.
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V. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought about many
changes to their society as a whole. Yet, although Lenin and
the other new leaders sought to erase much of their czarist
past and push on with the new socialist order, they found it
impossible to get away from the Russian heritage. Despite
the re-naming of the state and the attempts at departure
from the old ways, most Soviet citizens were still Russians
at heart (excepting, of course, the various assimilated
Turkic, Asian, and Baltic cultures). The new Red Army
proved to be no different. Lenin could not afford to erase
every vestige of czarist influence from the military because
it would have required the disposal of many strategies and
tactics fundamental and necessary to any military--western,
eastern, or otherwise. The heritage of the Russian Army,
therefore, was passed on to the Red Army and can still be
seen today in many ways. Since this link between the past
and present exists, it is only logical that a historical
look at the Soviet military use of deception include a look
at the Russian use of the art.
A. THE MONGOL INFLUENCE
As with many armies of the past few centuries, the
Russian Army could trace its roots back to the influence of
another armed force. In some such cases, the influence was
provided by a small section of the culture, an influence
which eventually evolved into that society's way of fighting
war. The best example of this was the adoption of Prussian
methods by the German Army. Other "modern" armies were
heavily influenced by their enemies or captors. The Russian
case falls in this latter category, with the Mongols
providing the influence. The Mongol invasion of what is now
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considered the heart of European Russia came in two
campaigns, the first in the 1237-38 period and the second in
1240 CRef. 13: p. 52]. The Mongols retained relatively firm
control through the end of the century and then slowly began
to be assimilated into the Russian culture through
linguistic adaptation, religious conversion, and regional
intermarriage. This assimilation was essentially completed
by the mid- fourteenth century. CRef. 1^: p. 72] Counting
the earlier Mongol conquests on Russia's periphery, their
total period of rule amounted to about 250 years.
Subjugation of one group of people under another for that
length of time is bound to affect the lifestyle of the
former, and the Russian-Mongol relationship was no
exception. Since the Mongol people formed one of the most
military of states, their influence was strongest on the
then embryonic Russian military. Steven Stinemetz, in an
article on the Mongol military method, points out that even
today "the Soviet armed forces display striking similarities
to their Mongolian predecessors. They specialize in fast,
mobile operations, employ deception on an immense scale, and
enforce an unusually rigid tactical doctrine in order to
guarantee strategic flexibility ERef. 1^: p. 71]."
In his article, Stinemetz outlines four general themes
which suggest themselves in any study of the Mongol military
method and which can also be seen in the Soviet method: 1)
the interrelationship between tactical capabilities and
strategic possibilities, 2) conservation of resources, 3)
the danger of misinterpreting culturally inculcated usages,
and 4) strategic deception. Only two of the themes are
pertinent to this study: conservation of resources and
strategic deception.
Under conservation of resources » Stinemetz points out
that because of the Mongol numerical inferiority in
virtually every engagement, they were forced to appreciate
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and make judicious use of the "traditional force
multipliers: " terrain, firepower, mobility, and surprise.
One of the principle means the Mongols used in achieving
surprise was deception. Stimemetz ' s use of the term
strategic deception is somewhat inaccurate, at least in the
context in which he uses it. The deception to which he
refers is the practice of deceiving an enemy commander
concerning the "schwerpunkt" or main axis of one's attack,
an operation which falls into the realm of tactical or
operational deception more often than strategic. The Mongols
became particularly adept at this type of deception,
continually forcing the enemy to commit the bulk of his
forces and even reserves in the wrong area, leaving his
flanks exposed to attack. CRef . lA: pp. 79-80] This same
skill can be seen in the Soviet Army today, a skill which
has roots reaching back to the Mongols, but which also
received strong reinforcement in World War II at the hands
of the Germans.
These methods were, of course, copied first by the
Russian Army, only with horses instead of tanks. Up until
the seventeenth century, the Russian Army remained
predominantly a cavalry force based on the Mongol model,
using most of the mobile and deceptive tactics learned from
the Mongols. Beginning in the seventeenth century, Russia
began to look to the West for influence, especially in the
military realm. This trend was begun seriously by Czar
Aleksey Mikhaylovich and then further advocated by Peter the
Great. By the nineteenth century, however, the Asian
influence began to be felt again and a conflict developed
between two schools of thought in Russia: the Westernizers
and the Slavophils. The former believed the Russian
heritage, recognized as being heavily based on Asian
culture, was barbaric and of little value. The latter
considered their heritage to be unique and, in many cases.
46
superior to that of the West. CRef . 13: pp. 55-56] The
result of all this was a Russian military which incorporated
many of the best aspects of both influences. Considering the
relatively poor showing by western armies in the use of
military deception, it is logical for one to assume that the
Russian, and now Soviet penchant and skill in employing
deception has deep roots in the East and not in the West.
B. THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II
Without detracting from the Mongol and Russian
influences, it is no exaggeration to state that the Soviet
experience in World War II dwarfs all other experiences in
its influence on modern Soviet military strategy. It would,
of course, be folly to assume that the Soviets have
discarded their long heritage and now draw exclusively from
that relatively brief four years of war for the source of
their military strategy. As the previous section revealed,
there are several similarities between the Mongol and Soviet
methods of war, but I submit that the Soviets adopted the
Mongol methods unconsciously, rather than through research. •
World War II, however, stands as the only large scale
conventional war in which the Soviets have participated and,
therefore, serves as their only source of practical
experience.
In addition to that more pragmatic reason, there is also
a strong emotional reason why the Soviets look back so
frequently to the war. World War II represents to them a
period of extreme sacrifice and unbelievable human
casualties, as many as twenty million according to the
Soviets. But most important is the fact that it was a time
when the Soviet Union was fighting for its very survival.
Although Richard Pipes is absolutely correct in stating that
the Soviets and Russians have been the aggressor more often
than the defender CRef. 8: p. 18 3/ the vivid and bitter
memory of the Nazi invasion serves to virtually obliterate
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the Soviet memory of Soviet or Russian aggression. In short.
World War II has left an indelible mark on the memories of
those Soviet people who lived through the experience. Only
after that generation has passed on will the war fill a less
prominent role in the Soviet psyche.
So what does all this mean for Soviet military strategy?
It means the Soviets will fight a large scale conventional
war in much the same way they fought World War II. Of
course, adjustments will be made for newer, more mobile,
more powerful, and generally more capable weapons, but the
methods used to employ those weapons will be very similar to
those used forty years ago. Even today, the Soviets analyze
every major World War II battle in minute detail to
determine what was done right or wrong. They then play the
scenario through again with the modern weapons to see what
the outcome would be. The result is that virtually all of
their non-nuclear military doctrine ( and even some nuclear
doctrine) is based on their World War II experience. With
this in mind, it becomes apparent that Soviet employment of
deception today is likely to be based heavily on their
employment of the art in the war; and as it turns out, they
used deception a great deal.
Although methods for employing deception, and even
regulations governing that employment, had been developed by
the Soviets well before the war, they were generally ignored
by most commanders. Probably the biggest reason for this
neglect was Stalin's view of surprise, deception, and other
such elements of warfare as "transient factors. " His
emphasis was on the "permanently operating factors, " such as
morale and industrial potential. CRef . 15: p. 51] Needless
to say, Stalin's method of leadership discouraged any
argument on the issue and the Soviet military consequently
suffered. The opening stages of the war on the eastern front
saw the Soviets at a distinct disadvantage due to the German
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use of speed, mobility, surprise and, yes, even deception.
Both the Soviet Army and Air Force were dealt severe blows
and each suffered huge losses, but it did not take long for
them to recover and put into practice what they had just
learned. One of those lessons learned was the value of
deception, and each branch of the service began to use it
extensively.
1. Soviet Army Deception in World War II
The Army learned quickly that deception could be
instrumental in concealing from the "enemy the concept of an
operation, troop locations, composition, combat readiness,
and combat effectiveness, as well as achieving surprise in
offensive operations. Colonel General P. Melnikov, Chief of
the Soviets' M. V. Frunze Military Academy in 1982,
identifies three stages of development of camouflage,
concealment, and deception skills within the Army
throughout the course of the war. He never provides specific
dates for these stages and they simply represent broader use
of deception at each stage, but they do serve to show the
nature of the evolution of deception within the Army.
The first stage was characterized by limited time to
prepare for operations due to the speed of the German
advance. Specific operations included the battle of
Smolensk, the Vyazma defensive operation, the
counteroffensive at Moscow, and others. Despite this
limitation, Melnikov contends, the Army was still able to
implement a number of deceptive measures which greatly
contributed to the eventual German halt. The most notable of
these measures, in his words, included:
The three concepts of camouflage, concealment, and
deception all fall within the purview of the Russian word
maskirovka. The Soviets use the word maskirovka in any
literature concerning deception or its subsidiary concepts.
However, for the purpose of simplification, I will use only
the word deception, except when it is necessary to make
specific reference to any of the other concepts.
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. , , the creation of attack groupings at a considerable
distance from the front line or to one side of the
planned main axis of attack; accomplishment of troop
regrouping only at night and their advance to initial
areas for an offensive over a one or two day period;
constantly preserving the established routine in areas
where attacks were planned; conduct of reconnaissance
across a broad front extending beyond the limit of where
the main attack was to be delivered; reliable screening
of the area for concentration of the main grouping
against enemy ground and aerial reconnaissance; and the
attack by troops from the move. CRef . 16: p. 23]
Of particular importance to the Soviets during the
first stage was the experience they gained in simulating
troop concentrations.- They learned that a dummy troop
concentration would be successful only if enemy
reconnaissance detected at least twenty to twenty-five
percent of the amount of troops being simulated. In other
words, if the Soviets wanted to portray a concentration of
500 troops, they had to use a minimum of 100-125 and ensure
that the Germans saw them all. The personnel, along with
appropriate dummy equipment, radio chatter, etc. , were
usually sufficient to make German intelligence believe the
larger figure. Additionally, the Soviets learned that dummy
objects must be no closer than twenty kilometers from the
actual object and must not be located with them on the
probable axis of enemy flights. And, finally, optimum
results could be obtained only if the portrayal of the dummy
grouping lasted right up until the actual grouping moved
into the offensive. CRef. 16: p. 23.]
It should be recognized that the portrayal of a
dummy concentration is one of the most fundamental of
deceptive actions. Much deception, as pointed out in Chapter
2, is intended to divert the enemy's attention away from an
actual object or grouping. This is usually accomplished by
portraying a false object or grouping in the area to which
his attention is to be diverted. The Soviets learned this
basic skill quickly and with it "under their belt" were soon
able to attempt more sophisticated deception tactics.
50
The second stage in the Soviet Army's development of
a deception capability was marked generally by a refinement
and expansion of the skills they had learned i-n the first
stage. More specifically, this stage was characterized by a
transition from the employment of individual, separate
deception measures to the use of a whole complex of
measures, orchestrated to support large-scale operations. Of
particular importance in allowing this transition was the
fact that the Soviets now had more time to prepare their
plans which, in turn,_ became much more detailed and
sophisticated. One other important accomplishment during
this stage was the creation of special staffs to plan and
7oversee the implementation of deception operations.
Although Melnikov gives no dates for these stages, it is
apparent from the changes made during the second stage that
it did not begin much before spring of 1942. Before that
time, the Soviets had little time for proper preparation of
plans as sophisticated as those described in the second
stage. CRef. 16: pp. 2^-26]
The third stage saw a dramatic increase in the
overall use of deception and in the scope of the operations,
the latter sometimes encompassing more than one front (
a
front in this case consisting of several armies). The
typical objective of a deception plan during this time was
concealing preparation of an offensive. This indicates the
third stage must have begun sometime after the battle of
Kursk in 1943, when the Soviets firmly gained the initiative
and began their big offensive. This last stage also saw the
new deception tactics, learned since the opening of the
eastern front, begin to appear in regulations and manuals, a
sure sign that the Soviets had learned a lot about the art.
7
'The Soviet creation of special deception staffs appears
to have paralleled the British creation of same. Although
there might have been very small deception cells established
at the very outset of the war, the larger staffs did not
appear until late 1941 or early 1942.
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By this time, the Soviets had also learned the value of
security in regards to deception plans and operations, and
fairly stringent security measures were developed along
with, and in support of, each plan. CRef . 16: pp. 26-27]
Looking back over the three stages of development,
one can see a steady progression of skill in planning and
executing deception. The Soviets started out with simple
tactics and gradually expanded their knowledge and
experience until, by the end of the war, they were
implementing some rather sophisticated and elaborate
deceptions. Starting out simple as they did prevented them
from experiencing a particularly disastrous plan, which
could have happened had they started with some of the more
ambitious ploys used in the latter stages of the war. Once
convinced, however, of the value and effectiveness of
deception, the Soviets employed it on a grand scale. To give
an example of the scope of some of these operations, the
commander of the Soviet 18th Army approved, in June 1944,
the following resources for use in portraying a tank army
concentration: two rifle and two engineer battalions, three
artillery batteries, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment,
one tank company, one fighter aviation flight, one radio
company, one chemical company, 500 decoy tanks, 200 decoy
vehicles, 600 decoy artillery pieces, two decoy trains, 100
field kitchen mockups, 5000 smokepots, two sound units
(broadcast), four tractors, fifteen vehicles, and ten
motorcycles [Ref. 16: pp. 28-29]. Keep in mind, all these
resources were dedicated to supporting the deception plan
and nothing else. Obviously, the Soviets placed a lot of
faith in the effectiveness of their deception operations to
release that many resources.
Before leaving this section on the Soviet Army, it
is interesting to note some of the means the Soviets
employed in their deception operations. In addition to the
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standard means, such as decoys, feints, dummy
concentrations, etc. , they also used some fairly unorthodox
means. Although in violation of the Hague Convention, it
was not uncommon for Soviet .soldiers to don German uniforms,
sometimes by groups as large as entire battalions. Since the
Soviets refrained from doing this too often, the Germans
usually suffered higher than normal casualties or prisoners
when they encountered these troops. One Soviet soldier made
a repucation for himself by occasionally donning a German
uniform (usually SS) and either killing or capturing
high-ranking German officers. In one such case in 1943, the
Russian kidnapped a German general commanding the Rowne
Military District, solicited the aid of the general's
orderly in loading the body (gagged and wrapped) into a
truck and drove away. Another favorite of the Soviets was
the release or rigged escape of German prisoners of war
after providing them with false information, or arranging
the capture of Soviet soldiers who had been fed false
information. All in all, the Soviet Army demonstrated
considerable ingenuity and skill in using deception
throughout the war. CRef . 17: pp. 30-31]
2. Soviet Air Force Deception in World War II
During World War II, the Soviet Air Force also
became an ardent supporter of deception. However, its
interest in the art focused heavily, although not
exclusively, on camouflage and concealment of airfields
rather than active deceptive employment of aircraft. Of
course, the Soviet Air Force (SAF), just as any other
combatant's air force at the time, employed some
deceptive-like aerial combat tactics (usually in the form of
feints), but these were at such a tactical level that it is
hardly worth mentioning them. Toward the end of the war, the
Soviets did begin to deploy aircraft in such a way as to
support an overall joint deception operation. A good example
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of this was the use of bogus reconnaissance sorties
indicating Soviet ground interest in areas where there
actually was no interest. Such a tactic served to divert
German attention away from areas where primary Soviet
attention and efforts were to be directed. However,
incidents in which the Soviets employed deception in the air
were extremely rare. The bulk of SAF deception in World War
II was used to protect airfields and aircraft on the ground.
The Soviets were well justified in their
preoccupation with airfield protection since much of the Air
Force was destroyed on the ground during the opening stages
of the war on the eastern front ( eastern from the German
perspective). On 22 June 1941, the first day of Operation
Barbarossa, the German codename for the attack on the Soviet
Union, the Germans used a force of 500 bombers, 270 dive
bombers, and 480 fighters to hit 56 airfields containing
almost three-fourths of the total Soviet combat aircraft
CRef. 18: p. 11]. By the end of the day, 1,811 Soviet
aircraft had been -destroyed, 1,489 on the ground and 322 in
the air CRef. 19: p. 15 3. In a scene soon to be repeated by
the Japanese in December 1941 at Hickam Air Base, Hawaii,
German fighters attacked an airfield where more than 100
Soviet aircraft, including bombers, fighters, and
reconnaissance aircraft, were neatly parked in close rows.
After repeated passes throughout the next twenty minutes,
the Germans destroyed every aircraft there CRef. 20: pp.
11-123.
The devastation inflicted on Soviet air units was
unprecedented, and still stands as the record for the
highest number of aircraft lost by any air force in such a
short period of time. The magnitude of the destruction had
an immense impact on SAF commanders, and measures were
quickly adopted to ensure it would never happen again. One
Soviet military writer. Col Simakov, described these
measures in the following, rather understated terms:
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Having summed up the experience from the war's first
days, the VVS (air force) commander issued a special
directive in July 1941 concerning the camouflaging of
airfields and measures which would ensure lowering
aircraft Tosses caused by enemy air strikes on them.
CRef. 21: p. 3 3
The special directive was issued on 9 July 1941, just
seventeen days after the eastern front had opened. The fact
that the Air Force commander signed the document, rather
than having individual unit commanders employ whatever means
they saw fit, demonstrates the high level of interest in
camouflage and concealment among SAF officers at that time.
Q
The July 1941 directive, short and to the point,
outlined three basic approaches which formed the core of
Soviet passive airfield protection measures employed
throughout the war: aircraft dispersal,
camouflage/concealment, and deception. The hastily adopted
measures apparently had some fairly immediate beneficial
results, at least in the Soviets' view, for Col Simakov
noted that:
Strict observance of camouflage rules gave good results
and allowed the enemy to be misinformed and directed to
dummy objectives. From 14 to 18 August 1941, enemy
aviation attacked from six to eleven times each of six
well prepared Central Front dummy airfields on which
Blywood airplanes and rotting DI-5 gliders were located,
uring the same time, bombers which were hidden in a
forest four kilometers from them were not subjected to a
single attack and our aviation had no losses. CRef. 21:
p. 3]
While this quote focuses on only one small segment of time
and fails to mention the success of subsequent German
attacks in other areas, contemporary Soviet writers on the
subject of airfield camouflage, concealment, and deception
are virtually unanimous in claiming that such measures, once
pA reproduction of the 9 July 1941 directive by General
Zhigarev, as cited in FBIS, can be found at Appendix A, page
103.
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adopted, made significant contributions to the survival of
Soviet airfields.
Drawing from a full year of experience, the SAF
commander in June 1942, Lt Gen of Aviation Novikov, issued a
directive which stressed the importance of effective
camouflage, concealment, and deception. Although Novikov'
s
orders were not particularly detailed in terms of specific
measures to be adopted, they did serve to reinforce and
support a growing awareness among high-ranking Soviet
officers that camouflage, concealment, and deception could
be, and was, highly beneficial to SAF airfield
survivability. Of particular importance in Novikov'
s
directive was the statement that "air defense and camouflage
cannot be made mutually exclusive; on the contrary,
camouflage and concealment must supplement the overall
system of an airfield's antiaircraft defense." This is a
statement which should be seriously considered by
contemporary planners for airbase survivability. Many
similar directives were published throughout the war, five
of which can be found reproduced in part at Appendix A,
pages 103-105.
In analyzing the camouflage, concealment, and
deception used by the SAF during World War II, it becomes
apparent that it can be easily divided into the two basic
variants of deception: disguising and distracting. Many of
the methods inherent in these two variants employed by the
Soviets are interesting and deserve closer scrutiny since
they provide some insight into how the Soviets may employ
deception in future military conflicts.
Q
A reproduction of the 22 June 1942 directive by General




First priority for the SAF was the basic
concealment of airfields in use. As the war progressed, the
Soviets began to demonstrate surprising ingenuity in
concealment through the use of several methods. Most of
these methods were variations in simple camouflage, but
several entailed slightly more active means of deception.
All such methods, however, served only the purpose of hiding
the operational airfields, or at least making them appear
less attractive as targets.
A fundamental principle in camouflage is the
judicious use of natural terrain features, and the Soviets
proved to be quite adept in this. At airfields located in
the vicinity of forests, aircraft were parked among the
trees, and taxiways to the open runway were concealed. If
forests were not readily available, then small coniferous
trees, such as firs, were planted throughout the aircraft
parking area. Experience showed that this type of natural
camouflage for 15-20 aircraft generally required 15,000
young trees per month. Since this sometimes posed
transportation problems, not to mention the destruction of
forests, mockups of trees were developed which were made out
of wood and cloth.
In addition to transplanted or artificial trees,
the Soviets also made other natural-looking camouflage.
Bushes were used in much the same manner as trees;
camouflage "netting" was made out of straw, stalks of corn,
sunflowers, or reeds when such vegetation was in season;
small, lightweight haystacks were placed on grass runways
when not in use. Vehicle and aircraft tracks were concealed
by covering them with false patches of vegetation or fake
swampy terrain, made out of moss, slag, and grass.
CRef. 21: pp. ^-5]
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The Soviets, of course, also used manufactured
camouflage and decoys. This included not only the typical
brown and green splotched camouflage netting for use in
summertime conditions, but also the solid white material for
use in snow. There were also some inflatable decoys of
aircraft and vehicles as well as pre-fabricated plywood
dummies. But these were generally in short supply and the
Soviets were often forced to employ homemade camouflage and
decoy equipment. As a result, they became quite good at
using anything that was available (especially terrain
features and vegetation) and at scavenging. This skill
proved to be crucial to any Soviet employment of deception
because of limited supplies, and it is a skill that should
be cultivated by the U. S. military. Many tales are told of
the resourcefulness of World War II American G. I. s, but that
resourcefulness appears to have given way to a strong
dependence on continuous supply and transportation support,
a condition unlikely to last very long in a large-scale
conflict.
On the more active deceptive side of protecting
operational airfields, the Soviets usually sought to make
them appear either unused or abandoned. This was done by a
number of means, to include the construction of dummy bomb
craters, ditches, and gullies all over an airfield.
Sometimes the Soviets used a little double deception in
making an operational airfield look like a dummy field,
accomplished by intentionally poor camouflage techniques
which allowed the rib construction of aircraft decoys to be
seen from the air. In support of this, the actual aircraft,
when not flying, were covered with wooden casings and cloth
painted an unnatural color which gave the aircraft the
appearance of poor quality decoys. These measures, in
concert with others already mentioned, sometimes convinced
the Germans they were looking at a dummy airfield.
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b. Distracting Variant
In addition to the deception measures applied to
the concealment and disguising of operational airfields, the
Soviets began to look for ways to distract the Germans'
attention away from those fields. The primary means used to
accomplish this were dummy airfields. These fields involved
far more than simply mowing a strip of grass in an open area
to look like a landing strip. Good quality decoy aircraft
and support vehicles had to be built and deployed; dummy
buildings and tents w.ere erected; lighting was strung up and
operated at night; and many more measures adopted. Even
then, an airfield with little or no activity around it was
soon suspect to the Germans, so the Soviets had to allocate
sufficient personnel to generate some activity (driving
vehicles, "refueling" decoy aircraft, operating lights at
night, etc. )
.
Even these efforts, however, did not prove to be
enough to convince the Germans sometimes. A dummy airfield
can be planned out and developed in excruciating detail and
then made to appear on the ground as if it is fully
operational, but without some air activity at least in its
vicinity, all that work can be for naught. The Soviets,
therefore, arranged for incoming flights to first circle the
dummy fields and then approach the operational fields at low
altitude. One problem that continually cropped up for the
Soviet pilots was that German reconnaissance aircraft would
sometimes follow them home, spot the operational airfield,
and then direct bombers to attack it. In the words of Col
Simakov:
Various ways to cut (the German reconnaissance aircraft)
off began to be used later on: flying over a checkpoint,
circling on the flight path, making loops, and
simulating a landing at a dummy airfield. CRef . 21: p.
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Simulating air activity over dummy fields, therefore, became
important not only to lending credence to the dummy field's
authenticity but also to protecting the location of the
operational field.
As the war progressed, the Soviets naturally
gained considerable experience in developing these fields
and soon began to create elaborate complexes of them.
Sometimes one operational field would have as many as five
to ten dummy fields around it, some in direct line with the
probable enemy approach routes in order to serve as screens
for the operational one. The Soviets learned that the
optimum distance between an operational field and its dummy
network was ten to fifteen kilometers. This was sufficiently
close to easily simulate air activity over the dummy fields,
but far enough to prevent German pilots from spotting the
operational field as they bombed the dummies. Quite often, a
complex of dummy airfields was created in a certain area
where there were no operational fields. In such cases, the
Soviets were generally seeking to portray a concentration of
air power in support of a false ground main axis of attack.
CRef. 21: pp. 5-7, 9]
Finally, the Soviets constantly moved their air
units from base to base, many times vacating an operational
field and moving to a dummy field the Germans had discovered
was false. In such cases, the former operational field was
maintained to appear as if it were still operational. In
short, the whole process had the appearance of a giant shell
game. Although the SAF continued to suffer aircraft
casualties and airfield damage throughout the war, the
German pilots and intelligence officers were quite often
confused as to which field was real and which was false. The
Soviets created so many dummy airfields that it took
considerable resources to bomb them all.
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In concluding this section on the Soviet
employment of deception in World War II, it is appropriate
to point out some of the more important lessons they learned
in that regard. One should keep in mind that these lessons
have been carefully studied in the forty years since the war
and incorporated into the Soviet method of fighting a war
today. Although undoubtedly many lessons were learned, only
the five most important are listed here:
1) A deception plan must support the overall operations
plan. Col Simakov, in his article on SAF camouflage,
concealment, and aeception, stressed this point
repeatedly, sta'ting that the needed effect was
obtained only if this axiom were followed. CRef . 21:
pp. 6, 10^ 12]
2) Joint services (army/air force) deception operations
are more beneficial than single service operations.
This ties in closely with the preceding point. Simakov
reiterated that SAF deception plans always supported
the Front s (army and air force) general surprise and
deception plan. This is important because if the army
units are portraying a false concentration of forces
in one area and the air force is portraying a false
concentration of air power in another, the enemy s
?erception of the opposing force posture could be
otally different from what was desired. However, a
deception plan coordinated with and supported by both
services tends to be more believable, primarily
because it provides more deceptive inputs across a
broader spectrum for the enemy to analyze; and this
last point flows into the next. CRef. 21: pp. 6, 9,
12]
3) A deception plan is much more effective and apt to be
believed if a whole complex of deceptive measures is
applied rather than only a few. The more inputs
provided, the more corroboration the enemy has to
acquire the desired perception. [Ref . 16: p. 26]
4) The Soviets learned the value of establishing special
staffs and units dedicated to planning and executing
deception operations. Although of questionable value
in peacetime, these groups in wartime greatly relieve
the work load of standard planning staffs and
engineering units. With such special groups at his
disposal, a commander is much more likely to employ
amd enjoy effective deception. CRef. 21: pp. 8-9]
CRef. 16: p. 25]
5) Finally, the Soviets also learned the importance of
good security measures with regard to the planning and
implementation of deception operations. These measures
were directed not only at the enemy, but also at
friendly personnel without a need to know. CRef. 16:
p. 27]
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VI. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ON DECEPTION
The issue of military doctrine and all its associated
terms is very important to both the military and Party
leadership of the Soviet Union. Whereas American military
doctrine is discussed in very broad and general terms in the
U. S. , Soviet military doctrine is scrutinized in minute
detail in the Soviet Union and its terms precisely defined.
Soviet military doctrine represents the official policy of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, as such, is set
in concrete and brooks no discussion once adopted ERef . 22:
p. 7^]. As one Soviet source puts it, "it is a unified
system of views and aims, free from private views and
estimates CRef. 23: p. 74]." Soviet military doctrine
itself does not address deception since issues at that level
are still fairly broad in scope. Deception does not enter
the picture until one looks at the component of military
science known as military art. An understanding of
deception's role in Soviet doctrine, however, requires an
understanding of the relationship between the various
subsidiary concepts.
Soviet military science is "a system of knowledge on the
nature and laws of war, the preparation of the armed forces
and the country for war and the methods of its conduct
CRef. 24: p. 74]." Unlike military doctrine, in some
components of military science differences of opinion are
permitted and sometimes even encouraged. There are seven
components of Soviet military science: general theory of
military science, theory of the organization of the armed
forces, military geography, military history, theory of
training, military-technical science, and military art
CRef. 25: p. 1.3]. The latter component, military art, is
sometimes called the "Theory of the Art of War," and it is
this component of military science on which we now focus.
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Military art is applied by the Soviets at three levels:
strategic, operational, and tactical. These three levels can
be readily distinguished in most Soviet combat operations,
including the implementation of deception plans. At the
strategic level, the Soviet General Staff is responsible for
planning and directing two forms of strategic military
operations: strategic-global and strategic groupings of
operational formations. Global, national, and theater
operations are all grouped within this level. The
operational level is characterized by operational formations
within a theater. These formations consist of fronts and
armies; the front is the basic operational formation, the
army is the basic combined arms formation. Within the
tactical level fall the remaining subordinate levels of
organization: divisions (tactical large units), regiments
(tactical units), and battalions (tactical sub-units) and
below. A summary of the three levels' interdependency can be
worded thus: "Strategic success is based on operational
results. Operational results are based on the correct
application of tactics CRef. 25: p. 1.3]." In this
statement, one can see how a multi-level application of
deception could be meshed into one operational or even
strategic plan.
A. RELATIONSHIP WITH SURPRISE
Looking at the components of military art, we can begin
to see where deception fits into all of this. There are
seven components of military art: 1) speed and shock
(mobility, maneuver, and high rates of combat operations),
2) concentration of effort (decisive superiority at the
decisive place at the decisive time), 3) surprise and
security, 4) combat activeness, 5) preservation of combat
effectiveness, 5) conformity of the goal, and 7)
coordination of forces [Ref. 26: p. 123. The key component
here, in terms of deception's role in Soviet military
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doctrine, is surprise. Deception itself is actually never
directly addressed in official Soviet treatment of military
doctrine, science, and art. However, it is frequently
discussed in unofficial articles by Soviet officers in such
military publications as Red Star, Aviation and
Cosmonautics , and many others. Most of these writers stress
the important and sometimes crucial relationship between
surprise and deception.
Surprise is not, of course, synonymous with deception.
In fact, surprise can be achieved without the use of
deception, although the probability of its achievement is
greatly reduced without some deception. Surprise refers to
"an action or series of actions which are sudden in
occurrence, forceful in thrust, completely unanticipated,
and decisive with regard to outcome CRef. 27: p. 5]."
Illustrating the importance of surprise to the Soviets, the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia provides the following
definition:
Surprise is one of the most important principles of.
military art, entailing the selection of (proper)
timing, the mode and manner of military action, allowing
strikes when the enemy is least prepared to repel them
and, moreover^ paralyzing the enemy s will to mount
organized resistance. It is achieved by confusing the
enemy of your intentions, by keeping secret your
intentions for battle, and by concealing preparations
for action; by applying new means of destruction and
those types of military actions unfamiliar to the enemy;
by correctly choosing the direction of the primary
strike and time for its initiation; by applying
unanticipated strikes by means of aviation, artillery,
tanks, and the surprise use of all types of fire; by
rapid maneuvering, decisive action, forestalling the
enemy's launching of strikes. .
.
; by conducting
deceptive actions and camouflage; and by adeptly using
the area s relief characteristics (i.e. geography),
weather conditions, and seasonal variables. CRef. 28:
p. 5]
This emphasis on surprise is seen not only in Soviet
treatment of conventional warfare but also in their
treatment of strategic (nuclear) warfare. The attainment of
strategic surprise through preemptive nuclear strikes is
openly discussed in Soviet literature CRef. 29: pp. 33-39].
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It is not surprising to see security go hand-in-hand
with surprise in the Soviets' seven components of military
art. Every one of the actions mentioned in the quote above
requires effective security to achieve the desired element
of surprise; otherwise, the enemy could be forewarned and,
at the very least, foil the operation. At worst, the
surprise could be turned against the perpetrator and wreak
havoc on his plans, perhaps even causing significant losses
and casualties. The Soviets realize all this and apply
stringent security measures to help ensure the element of
surprise is achieved, maintained, and exploited. But even
the best of security cannot always ensure surprise, so the
Soviets also employ deception to disguise preparations for
an operation and to distract the enemy' s attention away from
the preparations.
B. MASKIROVKA
The Soviet view of the concept of military deception is
treated with one word: maskirovka. As is readily apparent
in the spelling, the word is based on the root "mask.
"
Maskirovka encompasses three subsidiary concepts:
camouflage, concealment, and deception; and U. S.
publications quite often translate the word in just that
manner. Although each of the three subsidiary concepts is
slightly different from the other, the term deception
sufficiently describes the overall concept and the Russian
word maskirovka can be accurately translated as such.
Just as with any Soviet military operation, deception
can be applied at three levels: strategic, operational, and
tactical. At the strategic level, the Soviet Supreme Command
is responsible for approval of any deception plans.
The recent U. S. Air Force focus on airbase
survivability (ABS) has included a subsidiary concept using
the name camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD).
Although most of the emphasis is on camouflage and
concealment, the USAF s view of CCD essentially parallels
the Soviets view of maskirovka.
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Deception plans at this level could support the initial
operations of a war ( such as a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO)
or invasion ( such as those seen in Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Afghanistan). The fairly well-known Soviet use of
disinformation is also generally done in a strategic nature.
At the operational level, deception is used to support broad
operations across a wide spectrum of the entire front. This
can include operations at the front (organizational), army,
and theater level. In such cases, the commander responsible
for the operation being supported by deception is
responsible for the approval of the deception plan. Because
of the risk of possible interference with neighboring
fronts' operations, every operational deception plan must be
based on a joint or unified plan developed and issued by the
Supreme Soviet Command. CRef . 30: p. 263 Finally, tactical
deception is applied at the division level and below.
Again, the commander responsible for the supported operation
is responsible for the deception plan's approval. Close
coordination is required between adjacent units to ensure
non-interference. CRef. 27: pp. 25-263
Soviet literature on deception reveals an ever growing
knowledge in the subject; knowledge based not only on their
experience in World War II but also on more recent repeated
application of deception in numerous exercises. In the
course of such exercises, Soviet planners have been able to
develop a number of basic guidelines to follow in the
planning and implementation of deception operations. Four of
the most notable of these are listed below, and if compared
to the basic deception planning principles in Chapter II of
this thesis, one will notice a remarkable similarity.
1. Guidelines for Planning
a. Activeness
The first of these Soviet guidelines is
activeness in the application of deception. This term
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demonstrates that the Soviets prefer to actively deceive an
enemy, to aggressively intrude in the enemy's decision
process, seeking to create confusion which results in
indecision and mistakes. Keep in mind the Soviet desire for
surprise and swift exploitation of its results. Active
deception is designed to aid in these goals, and the enemy
does not have to stay indecisive very long for the Soviets
to reap its benefits. CRef . 31: pp. 27-28]
b. Plausibility
This guideline is identical to the one by the
same name among the basic planning principles in Chapter II.
Any deception must be plausible to the enemy. The enemy must
believe that his opponent is capable of doing what is being
portrayed to him. The Soviets also stress the quality of
their decoys and camouflage; the quality must be sufficient
to realistically represent the object being copied, or to
hide it in the case of camouflage. [Ref . 31: p. 28]
c. Continuity and Timeliness
Again, a similarity can be seen between this
Soviet guideline and the principle of timing in Chapter II.
The Soviets teach their planners to ensure there are no gaps
in the coverage provided by the deception plan. Coverage
must be continuous and timing must be precise; if either is
compromised, the entire plan is jeopardized, possibly
thwarting its plausibility and increasing its risk of
detection. CRef. 31: p. 28]
d. Diversity
This ties in somewhat with the principle of
detectability in Chapter II. In order to avoid stereotyped
or repeated deceptive measures, the Soviets emphasize the
employment of a broad range of means in any deception plan.
This ensures the enemy is viewing as many different
deceptive inputs as feasible so that no single input becomes
suspect. Each input builds on and corroborates the others
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being provided, all of which results in a believable false
picture. [Ref. 31: p. 283
2. Categories of Maskirovka
The development of a viable, comprehensive deception
plan is made easier when the deception means available to a
planner are organized into appropriate categories. Soviet
literature on the subject suggest they have identified four
such categories.
a. Camouflage Measures
This encompasses all possible camouflage
equipment and techniques. What first comes to mind at the
mention of camouflage is the typical brown and green
material used for concealing objects, and it probably does
constitute the greater portion of this category. However,
one must not forget the extensive Soviet use of natural
vegetation as well as terrain features for concealment, both
of which are considered camouflage measures. CRef . 31: pp.
29-31]
b. Imitation
This category includes the most fundamental
forms of imitation, such as decoys or dummies, as well as
more sophisticated measures, such as active intrusion into
the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum and
imitation of his signals ( sometimes called radio or radar
deception). The manipulation of one's own objects
(distortion of installations or force groupings so that they
appear different) or electronic signals is also included in
this category. CRef. 31: pp. 31-32]
c. Demonstration Maneuvers
For the Soviets, demonstration maneuvers can
mean any kind of deceptive maneuvering of forces. This
includes feints, which may involve direct confrontation with
the enemy, or demonstrations, which usually involve a show
of force (or buildup of force) without confrontation with
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the enemy. Essentially, any movement of forces which is in
support of a deception plan falls within this category.
CRef. 31: pp. 32-33]
d. Disinformation
This is a category of deception the Soviets have
developed to virtual perfection. It is in fact more commonly
used in the political realm than in military operations.
Disinformation, or misinformation as it is called in the
West, is the deliberate and public misrepresentation of
facts. It is very close to the category of administrative
deception means described in Chapter II. Disinformation
involves the presentation of deceptive information through
such media as newspapers, television, or radio. Due to the
closed nature of Soviet society and the strict security
maintained around any of their military installations, the
employment of disinformation through public posting of such
things as flight schedules would be very rare. CRef. 31: p.
33 3
To conclude this chapter on deception in Soviet
military doctrine, it is apparent through Soviet treatment
of the subject in literature that deception is important to
the successful conduct of military operations during
wartime, at least in theory. Despite the emphasis on
deception by military writers, Soviet commanders in the
field do not all share the same degree of enlightenment as
their intellectual colleagues who write the articles. The
reproving tone of many of the more recent articles suggests
that peacetime employment of deception by the Soviet
military is lacking in alacrity and frequency. Many units
which have employed deception in exercises have been judged
as being careless and sloppy in its application CRef. 32: p.
33]. This certainly is not the picture of efficiency
provided by articles on Soviet use of deception in World War
II. CRef. 27: p. 33]
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So does all this mean we need not concern
ourselves with the possible Soviet use of deception in a
future conflict? No, it does not mean that at all. The
likelihood of a state's future use of deception cannot be
predicted based solely on the attitude of some of its
military commanders toward the art during peacetime.
Deception can be very time-consuming and complicated in both
its planning and execution phases, and without a specific,
real-time threat, commanders have little incentive to employ
it. Realizing this problem of incentive, the Soviet military
leadership has approved the inclusion of a requirement in
the publication Field Regulation for Staff that all
operations plans at division level or higher include a fully
developed supporting deception plan ERef. 26: p. 12]. This
requirement, which ensures peacetime practice of deception
whether commanders like it or not, coupled with the fact
that wartime provides dramatically stronger incentive to any
heretofore blase concept, suggests that Soviet commanders
will very likely overcome any indifference to employing the
art. One source sums up this train of thought as follows:
It cannot be assumed that the rather casual attitude
toward camouflage and concealment displayed by some
( Soviet) commanders during peacetime would be evident
during combat operations. The Soviets demonstrated in
World War II the capability of conducting large-scale
military operations concurrently with the employment of
a multitude of deceptive practices, including effective
camouflage and concealment. In any future war or period
of tension, the Warsaw Pact must be credited with the
capability of implementing doctrinal guidelines which
require effective camouflage and concealment measures.
CRef. 33: pp. 33-3^]
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VII. ORGANIZATION FOR DECEPTION
It should be stated right up front that little is known
about Soviet organization of their combat units and staffs
relative to the planning and implementation of deception
operations. I am not speaking here about camouflage units;
much is known about such units and the equipment and methods
they will employ to satisfy camouflage objectives.
Considering the thrust of this thesis, the way the Soviets
organize to plan deception and then implement that plan is
of much greater importance. How is deception planned in the
Soviet military? Does the commander assign the task of
deception planning to his planning staff, or does he create
a special staff to handle it? Although we know little about
their present organization relative to this issue, the
answer is probably that a special staff is created. The
Soviet planning practices in World War II are the best
source for this guess. It cannot be emphasized too much that
the Soviets constantly scrutinize their actions during World
War II and model their current organization and doctrine
accordingly. We must also keep in mind the closing
statements of the last chapter, that deception is usually
neglected in peacetime, even by the Soviets. Therefore, our
only way to determine their current deception planning
organization is to look at how they did it during World War
II.
As shown in Chapter V, during the first few months of
World War II, the Soviet Army and Air Force quickly learned
the benefits of a well-planned and well-executed operation.
But their use of the art also quickly outstripped their
planning capability. Any planning staff is usually very busy
during wartime and the addition of more tasks can have a
detrimental effect on the quality of its output. Although
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not specifically stated anywhere, the Soviets undoubtedly
found themselves in such a position. Some high-ranking
officers at that time felt that the responsibility for
planning and execution of camouflage, concealment, and
deception should fall solely on the chief of engineer troops
CRef. 30: p. ^83. Most who felt that way saw it as an easy
way out of the planning overload. But as Lt. General
Dashevskiy pointed out in 1980, the chief engineer does not
have the overall picture of the battlefield that the
commander has:
Organization and conduct of operational camouflage,
concealment, and deception could not be the function of
only one field directorate agency of a large strategic
formation but were the duty of its commanding general
and his staff. In this instance we should note that the
reports of some fronts and views held by certain general
officers that operational camouflage, concealment, and
deception should be organized and carried out solely by
the chief of engineer troops of the front ( army) were
totally erroneous, for in matters of executing deception
maneuver, he is only the immediate supervisor of the
most technically complex activities. He had at his
disposal equipment and specialists for making mockups
and dummies, camouflage devices, and other means of
misleading and deceiving the enemy. The commander of
engineer troops performed all his concealment and
deception activities only following the front ( army)
plan, which had been approved by the commanding general.
IRef. 30: pp. ^8-^9]
The temptation to push specialized planning
responsibilities onto field agencies below HQ staff level is
probably felt by many military services even today. But
General Dashevskiy was absolutely right in pointing out that
the commander must be close to the deception planning
process. This does not mean he has to do the planning
himself, but his deception planners should be on his
immediate staff. Despite the differing opinions among Soviet
generals, special staffs were created to handle the planning
of deception operations. Col. General Melnikov, Chief of the
Soviets' M. V. Frunze Military Academy in 1982, described
these staffs like this: %
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The creation of staffs or operations groups for
directing measures for operational camouflage,
concealment, and deception began in formations in the
second period of the war. The staffs or groups included
specialists from the primary departments of a staff and
from combat arms and services. A strict limitation of
the number of persons participating in drawing up an
operation and m correspondence about it played an
important part in increasing the effectiveness of
camouflage^ concealment, and deception. All personnel
were familiarized with the mission usually a day or
several hours before the beginning of combat operations.
CRef. 16: p. 25]
General Melnikov also brought out an interesting
shortfall of these special deception planning staffs. As
late as in what he called the "third period" of the war,
there were no representatives of the intelligence
departments on these staffs. Although he did not provide
the reason for this omission, he did state that "there were
instances where the staffs did not always receive timely
data on the enemy and were not able to react swiftly to his
actions CRef. 16: p. 26]." This last statement must fall
within the realm of understatement. While intelligence
personnel are certainly not indispensable to all staffs,
they are to deception staffs. As discussed earlier, for a
deception plan to be detected ( and thus acted upon) it has
to play into enemy sensors, and only the intelligence staff
can provide the most complete information on that.
We can see, therefore, that the Soviets created special
staffs during World War II to plan and ensure the
implementation of deception operations. These staffs were
generally appointed by the unit commander, and
representatives were drawn from most of the more important
staffs (e.g., operations, engineers, artillery, signal, rear
General Melnikov never specifically identifies the
months or years that this third period covered, but he
does indicate it was after the Soviets were on the
offensive. This would mean the third period probably started
no earlier than the Battle of Kursk in 1943, a crucial
battle after which the Soviets began their long offensive
drive to the west. For more on Melnikov s discussion of
periods of the war, see pages 49-52 of this thesis.
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services, etc. ). The deception planning staff would be
given an objective and orders for each representative to
provide the necessary support from his own staff. It
should be pointed out that these staffs were not manned by
lieutenants and captains but usually by colonels and
generals.
Is this the way the Soviets plan and implement deception
now? We can only guess, but it is unlikely such staffs exist
in permanent form during peacetime, perhaps only temporarily
during exercises. As previously mentioned, the maintenance
of such staffs during peacetime can be time-consuming.
However, should the Soviets go to war, it is very likely
that they will follow their own example in World War II and
establish at least a facsimile, if not an exact duplicate of
the old special deception planning staffs. They have, after
all, proven to be effective in combat, and the Soviets are
known for nothing if not sticking to tried and true methods.
For an excellent example of how one of these special
deception planning staffs was formed, see the directive at
Appendix B, pages 106-107.
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VIII. PRACTICE VERSUS THEORY
We have now seen how the Soviets employed deception
during World War II and how their doctrine indicates they
would employ it in a large-scale conventional war today.
This last section looks at the few cases we have to study
since World War II in which the Soviets did use deception to
support military operations. They represent the only recent
Soviet "practice" of deception to compare to the "theory,
"
or doctrine. The problem, however, is that these cases do
not present a good example of Soviet military operations as
they would unfold in a conventional confrontation with the
U. S. The cases in question are the Soviet military
interventions into Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968,
and Afghanistan in 1979. In all three cases, the Soviet
Union employed military force, but each time, it was
directed at a much smaller state who was militarily poorly
equipped in relation to the Soviet Union and whose
government and armed forces were distracted by the internal
disorder which caused the Soviets to intervene in the first
place. This "modern-style" Soviet military operation,
however, is still useful to study since it has now become
somewhat of a norm for recent Soviet activity and because it
provides us with at least some indication of how Soviet
forces might be employed in a general war.
The deception employed in these interventions was
considerably different from that used in World War II. In
all three cases, the deception took on a political or
diplomatic character and was generally more strategic in
scope. The Hungarian case was essentially a learning
experience for the Soviets, and the deception used was very
subtle in nature. The Czech case offers an example of
deception used on a fairly grand scale, and is sobering in
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the fact that the same methods used against Czechoslovakia
would be ideal for achieving surprise in an attack against
NATO. Finally, the Afghan case demonstrates the continued
evolvement of deception's role in the Soviet military,
especially in the Soviets' periodic exercise of the Brezhnev
Doctrine. -^"^
A. 1956, INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY
The Soviet use of deception was not as obvious in the
invasion of Hungary as in the subsequent invasions of
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. It was used nonetheless and
undoubtedly aided in placing the Soviet military in a much
more advantageous position prior to the invasion than had
deception been omitted. The first symptoms of open rebellion
appeared in Hungary in the fall of 1955 when prominent
Hungarian communist writers signed a paper denouncing the
regime's cultural policies and forwarded it to the Hungarian
Politburo. The First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist
Party at that time was Matyas Rakosi, a staunch unpopular
Stalinist. Two years earlier, in June 1953, the Soviets had
forced the Hungarian leadership to appoint Imre Nagy as
Premier, and Nagy quickly endeared himself to the Hungarian
people by condemning past policies of the government.
However, his liberal policies soon resulted in Nagy's label
as a "right wing deviant" and led to his dismissal from the
premiership, and even the Party. Rakosi continued as First
Secretary until forced out by Khrushchev in July 1956 and
replaced by Erno Gero, a choice hardly better than Rakosi.
By October 1956, tensions began mounting sharply and, on
23 October, students began demonstrating peacefully, calling
for reforms, democratization, and the return of Imre Nagy to
power. At the time of the student demonstrations, Erno Gero
1 TThe Brezhnev Doctrine is a title given to the Soviet
Union' s self-proclaimed right to intervene in the internal
"" ' "
-ta' ^ -- •
,• ^ _^_. ^_ -, _ ._ ^
ga
affairs of cert in fellow Socialist states in order to
preserve the ins of socialism.
'
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and several other top conimunists were on their way home from
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, supposedly a day early because of the
mounting tensions at home. Gero had allegedly prepared a
speech to be given soon after his arrival, but was
apparently ill-prepared for the seriousness of the situation
he encountered when he finally did arrive. He soon began the
task of rewriting the speech which was to be prerecorded and
given over the radio later in the day. Confusion must have
set in because Gero kept postponing the recording of the
speech until finally he had to give it in person over the
radio. The speech surprised everyone with its inflammatory
nature, most notably the statement that "reminded" the
Hungarian people they had received the earlier government
resolutions "with approval and satisfaction. " In fact,
nothing could have been farther from the truth, for it was
primarily the government policies which the people were
protesting. Adding "injury to insult," Gero showed
incredibly poor judgement in his handling of the police,
repeatedly putting himself and the police in untenable
positions. The police intervention is what eventually caused
the demonstration to turn violent. The crowning blow to this
day of crisis was Gero's request for Soviet military
assistance late in the evening. CRef . 34: pp. 244-256]
Gero's extremely poor handling of the situation has been
perceived by some as being precalculated. There has been
speculation that the Soviets fully expected unrest to break
out in Hungary and, in order to provide themselves with the
justification necessary to intervene, prearranged with Gero
his provocative responses CRef. 34: p. 254 3. If this was
indeed the way it happened, then the use of deception played
a crucial role throughout the entire revolution. Every
conciliatory and restrained statement and action taken by
the Soviets (and there were several) would basically have
been a deception designed to lull the Hungarians into a
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false sense of security. However, a closer look at the
events of 23 and 24 October, as well as the international
situation, tends to refute such speculation. In fact, it is
highly unlikely that the Soviets had plans to "invade"
Hungary in October 1956.
First of all, the international situation had unfolded
in such a way that the Soviets had their hands full
elsewhere. Although revolution was not anticipated in
Hungary, the country had been identified as the "weakest
point in the socialist camp," but as it turned out, Poland
erupted in open rebellion before Hungary CRef. 35: p. 96].
Additionally, the situation in Suez had just come to a head
and a very crucial Soviet client, namely Egypt, was facing
the combined "aggression" of Israel, Britain, and France.
With Poland and Suez to occupy their attention, the last
thing the Soviets needed was a crisis in Hungary. Also, a
militaristic U. S. response to any Soviet intervention could
not be ruled out. It should be remembered, this was the era
of our doctrine of "rollback" of communism. Finally, once
the Soviets did intervene (the first time on 24 October),
their poor military performance made it quite plain that
they were not prepared. The primary objectives of Soviet
units in the first few days appeared to be safeguarding
Soviet diplomatic and military installations and selected
Hungarian Party and government strongholds CRef. 34: p.
256]. These were obviously not the actions of a state which
had carefully preplanned a military takeover and the
crushing of a rebellion. One last indication of Soviet
innocence in this charge was the "tongue-lashing" Gero and
the local Soviet military commander received from Mikoyan
when he and Suslov (both members of the Soviet Politburo)
arrived in Budapest on 24 October to troubleshoot the
situation. Mikoyan was reportedly extremely upset at Gero
for calling on Soviet assistance so early and at the Soviet
commander for providing the assistance CRef. 3A: p. 258].
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Until now, the focus has been on the beginning of the
revolution and the Soviets' first military intervention. In
this regard, there is little reason to believe that the
Soviet Union Jiad planned and was prepared to intervene at
that time and, consequently, that any deception was
intentionally employed. But what about the second and final
intervention, the one which succeeded in dashing any
Hungarian hopes for democratization? What caused the Soviets
to decide to intervene and when was that decision made? What
were the Soviets doing between the two interventions? The
answers to these questions are important in determining if
deception was used. If the second intervention took place
immediately following the decision, there was less of a
requirement for deception. If there was a significant time
lapse (several days) between the decision and its
implementation, then deception played an important role in
diverting Hungarian and world attention from the Soviet
military preparations.
Soon after the revolution began, the Hungarian
government began to experience serious upheavals,
culminating in the reinstatement of Nagy as Premier on 24
October and the ousting of Gero the following day ( to be
replaced by Janos Kadar). These important changes took place
while Mikoyan and Suslov were in Budapest, and it is very
likely the changes were made with their full approval. The
situation in Hungary was rapidly deteriorating and its
reversal required the installation of a much less
controversial figure at the helm. Nagy was well liked by the
public because of his lenient policies while he was Premier
earlier. His inability to work with Rakosi and his leniency
had led to his dismissal then, but now he was considered the
best hope in defusing the situation while retaining
sufficient "pliability" at the same time. When Mikoyan and
Suslov returned home on 26 October, they probably reported
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that the rebellion could be controlled and after careful
monitoring would soon quiet down.
For Nagy, the burning issue quickly became a cease-fire
with the revolutionary forces and the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Hungary; and the Soviets, at least initially,
demonstrated some willingness to comply ( although probably
more to alleviate tensions than to abide with Hungarian
wishes). But the revolutionary forces and even members of
Nagy's government began to call for, in addition to the
troop withdrawal issue, democratization, Hungarian
neutrality, and withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact).
Nagy's first step toward addressing these demands came on 27
October when he announced the formation of a new government
and appointed a few non-communists as members CRef . 36: p.
82]. This must have stirred some concern in the Soviet
Union, but was in no way a "bridge-burning" move.
The next day, 28 October, Nagy made an announcement
which essentially granted many concessions to the
revolutionaries' demands, but at the same time was somewhat
vague in its presentation. It is possible that Nagy could
feel control slipping through his fingers and used the
vagueness to hide his collapse of political control (
a
situation which would invite Soviet intervention). At any
rate, his announcement promised progress in Soviet troop
withdrawals but wisely made no mention of Hungarian
neutrality or withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact [Ref . 34: pp.
274-276]. On the same day, the Soviet paper Pravda
published an editorial which was quite conciliatory in
nature. Although it condemned the "counterrevolution" in
Hungary, it was otherwise upbeat and optimistic CRef. 34:
pp. 320-332]. Was this the first sign of a Soviet
deception? It is not likely since there was still no reason
to believe the situation was unsalvageable except through
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military intervention, and there would be no other reason to
employ deception at that time.
Nagy's 28 October announcement served to draw the
revolutionaries and government closer together, resulting in
a cease-fire and sharp decline in violent occurrences.
However, the calls for Hungarian neutrality and withdrawal
from the Warsaw Pact, as well as withdrawal of Soviet
troops, did not abate and, in fact, reached a crescendo on
30 October CRef. 34: p. 318 3. Nagy continued to resist the
first two but took another step closer to the "precipice" by
announcing the abolition of the one-party system of
government and recognized "democratic organs of local
autonomy CRef. 34: p. 286 3." This was undoubtedly a step
too far for the Hungarians to take since it struck at the
very heart of the Soviet political system. A few
non-communists in the government could be tolerated, but not
a multi-party system in a country openly calling for
democratization. If Khrushchev is to be believed, it was at
this time (30 October) that the Soviet Politburo was
discussing the possibility of military intervention.
Khrushchev's account reveals that the Politburo was not in
unanimous agreement on the issue. The impression developed
when reading the account is that initially the consensus was
towards non-intervention, but that when the matter was
brought before the Soviet Presidium, more dangers were
highlighted which led to the decision to "lend a helping
hand to the Hungarian working class before the
counterrevolutionary elements closed ranks CRef. 37: pp.
417-419]." Khrushchev gave no date for these deliberations
but indicated that Mikoyan and Suslov were gone. The two men
had returned to Budapest on 30 October and then returned to
Moscow on the night of 31 October-1 November. It is quite
possible that the decision to intervene was made very soon
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after their return to Moscow and report on the situation,
i.e., late on 31 October or early on 1 November C Ref . 38: p.
15].
This course of events provides an interesting background
to the publication of another Pravda article, this time an
official government declaration on the issue. Published on
30 October, the declaration surprised many with its highly
conciliatory tone, which included the admittance of past
mistakes ( referring to the Stalin era) and offered
negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It made no
direct mention of the neutrality and Warsaw Pact withdrawal
issues, but those had not yet appeared in official Hungarian
statements anyway. One noted scholar on the Hungarian
Revolution, Bela Kiraly, Commander of the Hungarian National
Guard during the revolution, contends that this declaration
was a deliberate attempt to deceive the Hungarian people
while preparations for an invasion quietly continued
CRef. 36: p. 1073. To be sure, no big step was taken to
actually withdraw the troops since the declaration referred
only to negotiations on the subject. A lot of forethought
and deliberation is apparent in the text of the declaration,
which means it was probably prepared either the day before
(29 October) or at least very early on the 30th. That means
it was probably written before Nagy announced the abolition
of the one-party system. If this is true, then it appears
the Soviets had not yet been pushed to the brink of decision
and that they still believed a peaceful solution was
possible. That would account for the lack of aggressiveness
in tone, but what about the issue of troop withdrawal? Were
the Soviets really serious in their willingness to consider
withdrawal? The answer involves some second-guessing of
their intentions, but it is unlikely the Soviets would ever
have completely withdrawn their troops from Hungary, at
least for several years. The very fact that they eventually
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did invade proves that keeping Hungary firmly within the
Soviet camp was of extreme importance. How could the Soviets
withdraw their troops from a crucial "ally" that had
demonstrated such a strong desire to break away from
Moscow's clutches? The bottom line in this particular case
is that the most important statement within the declaration
(from Hungary's perspective), that of a willingness to
negotiate on the issue of troop withdrawals, was most likely
a deliberate lie designed to placate Hungarian fears while
maintaining a Soviet advantage. As will be seen momentarily,
the Soviets continued to perpetuate this lie, even after the
decision to invade had certainly been made.
On 1 November, Nagy took the final, irrevocable steps
toward breaking away from Moscow. After numerous meetings
with the Soviet ambassador, Yuri Andropov, in which the
subject of troop withdrawals was repeatedly broached, Nagy
declared Hungary's neutrality (which automatically meant
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact) and requested assistance
from the United Nations' "four great powers" in defending
that neutrality ERef. 3A: pp. 326-328]. This must have been
the final straw for the Soviets. If the decision to invade
had not already been made, it was not long in coming.
The activities of the Soviet military for the next few
days were confusing to the Hungarian leaders. At times it
seemed some of the troops were being withdrawn, others
appeared to be moving in great circles, and sometimes it was
apparent that some were entering Hungary [Ref . 38: p. 16 3.
Nevertheless, from 1-3 November, Soviet units quietly sealed
off every major airport, railway station, and railway, while
publicly announcing that it was to "ensure the orderly
withdrawal of troops. " Nagy would have been blind not to
read through such a blatant deception. Jiri Valenta, in his
contribution to the book Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe ,
suggests that Nagy probably read through the deception as
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early as 1 November, making his neutrality announcement
after its detection CRef. 35: p. 101]. If such was the
case, it must have been apparent to him that he had already
gone too far, thus prompting the appeal to the United
Nations. However, the appeal was to no avail because the
hands of the U. N. were procedurally tied and no tangible
assistance could be offered. Even the U. S. had to limit its
reaction to simple rhetoric. Hungary's isolated location
(surrounded by communist or neutral states) and the Suez
crisis served to deter the U. S. from any conventional
military response. Finally, on 4 October, Soviet troops
numbering 120,000 CRef. 35: p; 102] formally executed the
invasion. Undoubtedly, most of the Hungarian leaders by this
time expected the invasion, but exactly when and with how
many troops was probably not known. This achievement of
surprise is not completely attributable to the deception,
but it owes much of its success to the optimistic and naive
atmosphere prevalent in Hungary during the preparation phase
for the invasion, a direct result of the continued Soviet
lie concerning troop withdrawals.
In conclusion, it can be said that deception did indeed
play a role in the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November
1956. However, it should be pointed out that there was
little Hungary could have done to repel a Soviet attack.
Therefore, the Soviet declaration of 30 October was probably
not a complete sham. The bulk of the text probably
represented an honest Soviet position. The troop withdrawal
issue was used to buy time while the situation was monitored
and a decision was made as to what should be done. In short,
the opportunity to deceive presented itself, it was cheap,
and some good could be derived from it, so the Soviets
employed it.
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B. 1968, INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The deception employed in the Czech crisis was much more
clear-cut in comparison to the Hungarian case and more
directly supported Soviet military objectives. Of. course,
there were undoubtedly many examples of political intrigue
throughout the crisis, a portion of which could be construed
as deception, but since political deception is a secondary
interest in this study, it will be addressed very briefly.
Of particular interest in this case is the deception
employed by the Soviets in the form of military maneuvers on
the Czech borders. Of the three cases addressed, this one is
most applicable to NATO concerns.
Essentially two types of discernible deception were
employed by the Soviets in 1968; or, to put it another way,
the Soviets used deception to serve two distinctly different
objectives. One objective was to provide justification for
the possible use of military force. The target in this case
was twofold: the communist world (primarily those states
under Soviet influence, especially the Warsaw Pact states)
and the non-communist world (the western powers, as well as
the Third World). The former was targeted in order to ensure
that the legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and correctness of Soviet Politburo decision-making
was not eroded; the latter, to discourage western
intervention and to minimize damage to the reputation of the
Soviet Union and the world communist movement. This
"legitimacy" function is a logical manifestation of the
Soviet proclivity for deception. Without getting into Soviet
motives for justification, it is easy to see this as an
ideal role for deception, one which very likely will be seen
in any future Soviet exercise of the Brezhnev Doctrine.
The key player in laying the deceptive groundwork for
this justification in the Czech case was the KGB. As "proof"
of the "counterrevolutionary" nature of the Czech reformist
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movement, the KGB produced caches of secret weapons
supposedly discovered on the Czech-West German border in
July 1968, allegedly placed there by imperialist forces.
Other KGB ploys included attempts to create the impression
of widespread opposition to the movement among "healthy
elements" in the Czech Party, and document falsification to
indicate both a "Zionist" and CIA conspiracy in the affair
CRef. 39: p. 543. Clear indication of KGB complicity in all
this is offered by Ladislav Bittman, a former deception
officer himself in the Czech intelligence service until his
defection during the Soviet invasion in 1968:
The active role of the Soviet intelligence service in
the events of 1968 and 1969 in Czechoslovakia centered
on the systematic implementation of political
provocation, disinformation and propaganda campaigns
aimed at influencing Czechoslovak public opinion,
terrorizing a selected group of liberals, and creating
supportive arguments for the legitimation of the Soviet
invasion. CRef. AO: p. 2093
This KGB role of providing legitimization has become
fairly commonplace whenever the Soviets perceive that their
actions, military or otherwise, may elicit undesirable or
even dangerous reactions from either communist or
non-communist nations. Although the ubiquitous Soviet
accusations of CIA and other western agency plots are often
not believed, the lack of hard evidence to refute the
accusations generally aids in moderating adverse reactions
directed against the Soviets. As long as this remains true,
the use of deception to provide justification for Soviet
actions will continue to be seen.
The second, and by far the more interesting and
effective deception used in the Czech crisis was that seen
in the Soviet military maneuvers which were conducted
throughout the last few months of the crisis. The military
nature of this deception makes it much more applicable to
the objectives of this thesis and provides us with the most
86
valuable lessons available on modern Soviet military
deception operations.
Apparently having learned from their experience in
Hungary, the Soviets began military contingency planning for
a possible intervention into Czechoslovakia as early as
February or March 1968 ( five or six months before the actual
invasion). Czech intelligence officers arrived at this
estimate after the invasion, basing it on, among other
indications, the fact that this was about the same time that
Czech linguists and specialists from Leningrad universities
were mobilized [Ref. Al: p. 1^]. Military intervention
remained a viable option to the Soviet leadership throughout
the crisis, although its implementation was seen as a
worst-case scenario. By May 1968, a Soviet military buildup
was well underway in the vicinity of Czech borders, and by
late June or early July, it was fairly well completed
[Ref. A2: p. 169]. The interesting aspect of this buildup
is that it was accomplished through the conduct of a series
of military exercises, not through the overt stationing of
troops on the border with the stated purpose of waiting to
invade Czechoslovakia. The Soviets were more subtle than
that, even though the exercises were highly advertized.
Jiri Valenta identifies two purposes for this military
buildup: first, as psychological pressure on the Czech
reformists, and second, as a logistic preparation under the
cover of military exercises CRef. ^1: p. lA]. The Czech
leadership could certainly observe the increase of military
activity on their borders and undoubtedly felt the pressure.
On the other hand, the Soviets had conducted similar
exercises in the past and could therefore parry any
accusations of coercion by pointing out their past history
of frequent exercises. Events appeared to come to a climax
on 23 July when it became known that the Soviets had agreed
to negotiations with the Czech leadership at Cierna.
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Coincidental with this revelation was the Soviet
announcement of exercise Nemerir the largest logistic
exercise held to date by Soviet ground forces. Although the
exercise began in the western portion of the Soviet Union,
it was extended to East Germany and Poland during the
conference [ Ref . 39: p. 5^]. On top of this, exercise Sever
started up before the conference, involving Soviet, East
German, and Polish fleets. When Nemen ended on 10 August,
exercise Sky Shield, an air defense exercise, as well as a
communication exercise, began the next day in the western
Ukraine, Poland, and East Germany ERef. ^1: p. 113].
Finally, on 16 August, Hungary was brought into the fray
when the exercises were extended for the first time into her
territory.
The result of all this was the conditioning, or
desensitization, of the Czech leadership to the Soviet
threat. On the one hand, the threat was quite apparent since
the Soviets made no attempt to hide it; on the other hand,
the threat had been present long enough (several months) to
become a customary condition to the Czechs. The danger was
still felt but the urgency had receded. Therefore, when the
invasion finally took place on 20 August, it still came as a
surprise to the Czechs and even to many western leaders. The
crowning blow to this deception was when the Soviets
succeeded right before the invasion to talk the Czech
military commanders into transferring significant amounts of
fuel and ammunition to East Germany, supposedly in support
of one of the exercises. In reality, the move was designed
to lower Czech fuel and ammunition stores, thus further
hampering any possible Czech resistance.
At this point, a side-track is appropriate in' order to
discuss the use of military exercises as a means to cover
more sinister intentions. Any country with a moderately
capable intelligence apparatus, and which faces an opponent
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of equal or superior military force, will have developed a
list of indicators (actions, or lack thereof, on the part of
the opponent) that will be present should the opponent
decide to attack. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, facing each
other now for about thirty years, have both developed the
compilation of such indicators to a fine art. Military
exercises trigger many of the alert mechanisms built into
these lists, but since exercises are conducted on a regular
basis by both parties, many indicators must be ignored, or
at least allowed to pass with no significant response for
the length of the exercise. Of course, any exercise
conducted is closely monitored by the -other side, but the
only alternative in terms of reaction would be to mobilize
in response to every major exercise conducted by one's
opponent. Such responses would be not only extremely
expensive, in light of the fairly high number of exercises
conducted by both sides, but could escalate into a
full-blown crisis. Therefore, NATO generally only monitors
any Warsaw Pact exercise and offers little other observable
reaction.
It can therefore be seen' that military exercises could
be used to mask a Soviet buildup in preparation for an
attack against NATO. A situation such as the one in 1968,
where Soviet attention and threatening posture appeared to
be directed at a fellow Warsaw Pact member instead of to the
West, is not necessarily cause for the relaxation of
vigilance on the part of NATO. In fact, Soviet attention
could easily swing to the West and NATO would find itself
facing a semi-mobilized foe. Of course, any Soviet military
activity coinciding with an apparent intra-Pact crisis would
be accompanied by repeated assurances that such maneuvers
were strictly in response to the local crisis, which is
exactly what happened in 1958. Faced with such a scenario,
NATO leaders would find it difficult to marshal sufficient
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political support to mobilize their armed forces.
Contributing to NATO's flaccid response in 1968 was the fact
that the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) was not moved
before the invasion. Due to GSFG's reputation as the best
trained, equipped, and prepared Soviet forces in Europe, its
movement was high on NATO's list of indicators of an
impending Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia CRef . ^3: p.
161].
P. H. Vigor, in his book Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory ,
provides a name for the method of achieving surprise through
conditioning: the dead volcano method. Just as people living
on the side or at the base of- a supposedly dead volcano
begin to accept it as a benign part of the landscape ( even
though it may smoke at times), so will a state become
accustomed to the continuous maneuvering, semi-mobilization,
or reposturing of a neighboring state's military. CRef. ^3:
pp. 163-165] This can be seen even when the mobilized state
is focusing its attention on its wary neighbor, as was the
case with the Soviet Union (with Warsaw Pact assistance) and
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
One of the most discernible examples of successful use
of the dead volcano method was Egypt's attack against Israel
in October 1973. Oddly enough, it appears Egypt's deception
was not intentional, at least not initially, but its success
on Israel was almost disastrous. Still smarting from the
drubbing handed out by Israel in 1957 (who used deception
quite successfully herself) and still seeking her own
solution to the Arab- Israeli problem ( as well as undoubtedly
seeking revenge), Egypt went through a number of
mobilization periods before her actual attack in October
1973.
Chaim Herzog, a prominent Israeli statesman who has held
several significant government positions (to include Israeli
Director of Military Intelligence, Israeli Defense Attache
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to the U.S. , and Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. ), identified
four such mobilizations during Anwar Sadat's presidency. The
first two occurred at the end of 1971 and in December 1972.
Both times, Sadat actually intended to attack Israel or
Israeli military positions but cancelled his plans for
various reasons. Therefore, exercise of the dead volcano
method apparently was not intended at that stage. The third
and fourth mobilization periods occurred in April-May 1973
and September-October 1973, the latter obviously in
preparation for the actual attack. Sadat's intentions in the
third mobilization are less clear, but it is quite possible
he recognized the value of the first two and began
intentionally conditioning the Israelis before the October
attack.
The Israelis, of course, were not blind to the four
periods of mobilization. All four were observed and closely
monitored. Many Israeli intelligence personnel predicted
each time that war would break out, while many of their
compatriots predicted otherwise. At any rate, the "cry wolf"
syndrome certainly set in as did, undoubtedly, a certain
amount of complacency due to Israel's obvious qualitative
military superiority over her Arab enemies. The result was
that despite the warning of several prominent Israelis,
insufficient precautions were taken to counter a full scale
Egyptian onslaught and Israeli troops were caught by
surprise at the opening of the war. The surprise was not
complete by any means, but sufficient to give the Egyptians
an early advantage; an advantage they failed to properly
exploit, leading to Israel's eventual triumph. CRef. ^A:
pp. 255-262]
Some people have pointed to Egypt's deceptive
maneuverings prior to the 1973 war and suggested that
perhaps they were a result of Soviet involvement in the
planning stages, or at least Soviet influence. The first is
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highly unlikely since Sadat purged, in 1971, all those in
the Egyptian military and politics who had close ties to
Moscow and, in 1972, expelled all Soviet military advisors
CRef. A5: p. 53]. The latter is possible, but there is no
particular difficulty in recognizing the value of the dead
volcano method and the Soviets have no monopoly on its use.
Therefore, it is very likely that Sadat, or one of his
subordinates, conceived of and planned the mobilization
deception, if indeed it was deliberately employed.
My purpose in describing the Egyptian dead volcano
maneuvers is to point out the potential success in utilizing
such a method. Whether the Soviets intentionally used the
maneuvers around Czechoslovakia in the months preceding the
invasion as a conditioning tool cannot be positively
confirmed. However, the result of the maneuvers was that
Czech leaders became desensitized to the danger on their
borders and were caught unawares on 20 August when the
Soviet invasion commenced. Again, the surprise was not
complete, but the Soviets moved with great speed and
effectively neutralized Czech resistance while the advantage
gained in the surprise was still theirs. Dubcek, the
reformist Czech leader during the crisis, described the
extent of the surprise he felt:
I declare on my honor as a communist that I had no
suspicion, no indication that anyone would want to
undertake such measures against us , . . that they
should have done this to me after I have dedicated my
whole life to the Soviet Union is the tragedy of my
life. ERef. 39: p. 56]
C. 1979, INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN
The events in Afghanistan in 1979 reveal a slightly
different Soviet approach to intervening in a sovereign
state's internal affairs. Although contiguous to the Soviet
border, Afghanistan was not as indisputably in the Soviet
"camp" as either Hungary or Czechoslovakia before their
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crises. This put the Soviets in an uncomfortable position
when it became evident in September 1979 that they might
lose what gains had been made toward establishing a
pro-Soviet socialist regime in Afghanistan. An unfavorable
reaction from the U. S. was likely in the event of a Soviet
military solution to the problem, and the Soviet leaders
undoubtedly recognized the danger this could pose to the
U.S. Congress' approval of the SALT II treaty. Obviously,
the importance of Afghanistan to Soviet interests won out
over SALT II, because in December 1979 approximately 80,000
Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan.
In light of the different Soviet relationship with
Afghanistan in comparison to their relationship with Warsaw
Pact states, it is somewhat surprising that deception was
not used more than it was. Of course, the Soviet military
superiority over Afghanistan was even more pronounced than
that over Hungary and Czechoslovakia, so deception' s role in
the actual invasion was not all that crucial. The prime
target for deception should have been the West, specifically
the U. S. and Europe. The Soviet surprise and shock at the
vehement American reaction proves that the extent of that
reaction had not been accurately predicted. It is quite
possible that judicious Soviet use of political deception
directed at the western nations, in concert with effective
operational and tactical military deception designed to
achieve surprise and bring the invasion to a speedy
conclusion, could have saved the Soviet Union considerable
trouble and embarrassment. Such was not the case, however,
since the use of deception was on a much smaller scale than
that used against Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the
continued evolvement of deception's role in modern Soviet
military actions is apparent, and its use against
Afghanistan is worthy of mention.
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Soviet deception before and during the invasion falls
into two categories: political and military. The political
deception was directed partly at Afghan President Hafizullah
Amin and partly at world opinion. Amin came to power in
September 1979 when he apparently turned the tables of an
assassination plot against him (he was deputy to President
Taraki at the time), planned by the Soviets and President
Taraki. The victim instead turned out to be Taraki.
CRef . 39: p. 55] Although a professed communist, Amin was
distinctly unpalatable to the Soviets since they blamed him
for instituting measures which caused nation-wide unrest
that the Afghan government had yet to bring under control.
Additionally, first-hand reports from Soviet military and
security officers on Amin's activities only served to
heighten Soviet distrust. CRef. ^5: p. 2553 Despite this^
the Soviets put up a facade of support for Amin, even going
as far as to send Lieutenant General Viktor Paputin, First
Deputy Minister of the Interior (Soviet), to Kabul to assist
Amin in security affairs, counter-insurgency, and possibly
personal protection. As it turned out, Paputin' s real
mission was to organize an anti-Amin coup among the former
supporters of Taraki and Babrak Karmal, Amin's eventual
successor. CRef. 39: p. 553
The coup against Amin took place 25-27 December 1979,
concurrent with the Soviet invasion. It is interesting to
note the timing of the invasion. Although not really
classified as deception, the choice of the Christmas
holidays for an invasion ensured a delayed western response
since most government leaders were on vacation. This Soviet
practice of beginning an invasion at inopportune times for
the western nations is certainly not a new concept ( e. g.
,
summer invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1958 which took place
while the U.S. Congress was in recess). The Egyptian timing
of their attack against Israel in 1973 during the Jewish Yom
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Kipper holidays is a classic example of this ploy and it can
be seen in countless other wars throughout history as well.
But it should be recognized that the Soviets are adept at
effective timing of invasions and western leaders should
keep this fact in mind during periods of heightened
tensions.
Another apparent deception in the political realm was
the situation surrounding the Soviet entry into Afghanistan.
I have already discussed the Soviet propensity for using
deception to justify such actions as invasions and this
practice was seen again in the case of Afghanistan.
Considerable attention has been given in the general media
to the Soviet claim that they were "invited" to come into
Afghanistan and assist Karmal in quelling his opposition.
Since Karmal was a communist fighting for the preservation
of socialist gains in his country, the Soviets claimed to be
completely justified in their intervention. The controversy
lies in Karmal 's arrival in Afghanistan. After Taraki '
s
succession to power in an April 1978 coup, Karmal fled to
Czechoslovakia and remained there until sometime in 1979
CRef. ^5: p. 2553. The Soviets claimed that Karmal returned
to Kabul several weeks prior to their invasion, but as both
Jiri Valenta and Adam Ulam suggest, it is much more likely
that Karmal arrived at the same time as the Soviet troops
and was able to commence the coup against Amin only with
Soviet assistance CRef. ^2: p. 232] CRef. ^tS: p. 255],
Little of this can be proven, however, so western nations
had to be content with expressing disbelief of Soviet
contentions and little else.
The tactical deception employed against Afghanistan was
reminiscent of that employed against Czechoslovakia. Just
before the invasion, Soviet advisors persuaded the
commanders of two Afghan armored divisions to turn in some
of their tanks for "technical modifications," all of their
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tank batteries for winterization, and their ammunition and
antitank weapons for inventory. The result was that two
crucial Afghan armored divisions were out of commission when
the invasion began, thus ensuring the Soviets encountered
less resistance. CRef. 39: p. 56]
In conclusion, the overall Soviet use of deception
before and during the invasion was much less grand than that
used against Czechoslovakia. Although a Soviet buildup was
apparent on the border, it was limited in scale because of
geopolitics (Afghanistan was not surrounded by Soviet client
states) and because of the lack of need for a large invasion
force. However, the deception used was effective. Amin
apparently was sufficiently deceived so as to allow a
successful coup against him, the western leaders were unable
to present proof that the Soviets were not invited into
Afghanistan, and two Afghan armored divisions were
neutralized because of deception.
The three cases of Soviet conventional military
involvement since World War II, Hungary in 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979, offer us
considerably different examples of Soviet deception than
that seen in World War II. But they are examples
nonetheless, and they demonstrate the important role
deception plays in achieving that critical element of
surprise. Although a conventional confrontation between the
Soviet Union and the U. S. is unlikely, we can be assured
that in the extreme chance such a confrontation should
occur, the Soviets will prove to be adept and energetic in
employing deception against us. We need only to look at
their contemporary writings on the subject and their use of
the art during and after World War II to understand its




Since the 1970s, there has been a tendency among western
intelligence analysts, especially in the United States, to
at least emphasize and sometimes exaggerate the capabilities
of the Soviet military and the threat it poses. Certainly
the Soviet military is a world-class armed force--in
strictly numeric terms (personnel and equipment) the largest
in the world. The que-stion now, after many pages of
discussing Soviet deception, is how good are the Soviets at
planning and executing military deception operations and how
dedicated are they right now to maintaining what skill they
possess? How likely are we to see them use deception in
their next military operation? And how likely are we to see
deception used against us should the U. S. ever find itself
in direct combat against Soviet troops? The answers should
be apparent in the previous pages. The Soviets have proven
themselves to be quite good at planning and executing
deception operations; they continue to be dedicated in
maintaining their skill; and they will very likely use it in
any future combat situation, including and especially
against the U. S. With this latter point in mind, a useful
conclusion to this thesis would be to summarize the main
points brought out concerning Soviet deception capability
and compare them to the American view and use of military
deception.
The Soviets have shown a distinct proclivity for using
deception and they have a long Russian history in which this
proclivity is deeply rooted. The development of Russian
society started in their villages where secrecy and
deception were used in response to a deep mistrust of
outsiders. This mistrust and xenophobia was carried over
into the crude monarchic leadership established in Moscow
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(Princely Court) and is present even today in the communist
government. One of the chief tools used to satisfy this
mistrust has always been deception.
The location of Russia, and now the Soviet Union, has
also had an impact on the development of a proclivity for
deception. Russia is, in effect, landlocked. Sure, she has
thousands of miles of seashore and many ports, some warm
water, but most of these ports are either frozen most of the
year or have access to the open ocean only through narrow
straits, channels, enclosed seas, or offshore islands, all
held by foreign and usually hostile powers. This has had an
enormous effect on Russian/Soviet trade and remains as one
of the strongest reasons for Russian introversion. Also,
Russia has always been surrounded by nations she considered
hostile, and this is just as true today for the Soviet
Union. All these conditions have bred a people who are
introverted, mistrustful, secretive, and deceptive.
In contrast, the United States is a very young country,
reaching back historically only a few hundred years. Our
ancestral roots reach out to many nations, making it
difficult to trace a specific American trait beyond the
founding of our nation. Our people have, in general,
developed into an open and honest, but often naive people,
willing to reveal almost everything about ourselves.
Although our society today is full of deceptive
machinations, particularly in the business community, we
almost view overt deception as a sin. After all, we are the
nation who produced a secretary of state (Henry L. Stimson)
who stated that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail"
and "the surest way to make a man trustworthy is to trust
him E Ref . ^6: p. 1073." Of course, Stimson was referring to
the preservation of American goodness as we ventured into
the international arena around the time of World War I, but
his statements typify our view of ourselves, as if we are
above deception.
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Unlike Russia or the Soviet Union, the United States has
unlimited access to the oceans. We are almost surrounded by
relatively warm bodies of water. This has made us a trading
nation from the very beginning and the greatest sea power
for several decades. With the exception of Britain in the
War of 1812, we have never been seriously threatened by any
armed force, nor have we ever been invaded by any foreign
power. After the American revolution in the 1770s, we have
never been subject to any foreign power. Except for the
short period when we were at war with Mexico, we have always
been bordered by friendly nations. All of this has given
Americans a very secure feeling, so that we have little to
fear in being open and honest with the rest of the world.
Therefore, speaking strictly in terms of national traits,
the Soviets have a strong proclivity for using deception
while Americans have very little.
In looking at the historical use of military deception
by the two nations, the Soviets can trace their history back
to the Mongol invasion of Russia in the thirteenth century.
The Mongol methods of waging war, which included the heavy
use of deception, were adopted by the Russian Army and then
eventually handed down to the Soviet military. The
devastation wreaked on the Soviet Union in the opening weeks
of World War II, after the German surprise attack, reminded
them of the value of surprise, while the four traumatic
years of the war forced them to develop an expertise in the
planning and execution of deception. In general, the Soviets
have approached the art in a much more institutional manner
than the United States.
With such shallow historical roots as a whole, Americans
have very little precedent for even considering deception.
What few skills we possess in using deception were slowly
adopted and have always been neglected. Our economic power
during and since World War II, which has allowed us to field
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impressive numbers and quality of men and equipment, has
discouraged any use of deception. We have much more recent
combat experience than the Soviets, but we hardly used
deception in those conflicts. Despite the Japanese surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, we still do not seem to
fully understand the crucial role surprise plays in combat
success. Except for very recent efforts ( since the late
1970s and early 1980s), our approach to deception has never
been institutionalized.
In the realm of doctrine, the Soviets still have an edge
on us. While the Soviets are frequently criticized for their
rigid command and control doctrine, their emphasis on
doctrine can also be considered a strong advantage in their
favor. In focusing heavily on military doctrine, a subject
such as deception tends to receive more attention than if
the doctrinal emphasis did not exist. Surprise receives
particularly heavy emphasis in Soviet military doctrine, the
effect of which overlaps into the field of deception. This
is due to the close link the Soviets see between surprise
and deception. To them deception has a clearcut goal of
achieving surprise, which in turn leads to combat success.
Soviet military commanders are required to include a
deception plan in support of every major operations plan.
While some commanders meet this requirement in a less than
enthusiastic manner, the mechanism to ensure reinforced
deception skills is there nevertheless. The Soviets also
place considerable emphasis on joint cooperation, not only
between contiguous ground units but also between services
(i.e.. Army and Air Force).
Military doctrine is certainly discussed, developed, and
followed in the U. S. military, but it does not receive the
focused emphasis as in the Soviet Union. The principle of
surprise is also addressed in American military doctrine,
but again, much more lightly than in Soviet doctrine. Also,
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the crucial link between surprise and deception appears to
be hardly recognized. Deception plans are sometimes drawn up
with no apparent goal than to "fill the square, " rather than
directly supporting the achievement of surprise. Although I
have personally been involved in some successful joint
service deception operations during exercises, service
parochialism has so far prevented this practice from
becoming a healthy and beneficial trend.
The organization of Soviet planning staffs to
specifically aid in developing deception plans cannot
readily be seen during peacetime. We can only assume that
they will do much as they did during World War II where they
created special staffs dedicated solely to planning
deception operations. Considering the Soviets' close
adherence to principles established in World War II, the
assumption that such special staffs will be created is a
fairly safe one.
In terms of deception organization, the U. S. military is
better off than in the areas just discussed. There has been
a recent resurgence of interest in deception that has been
translated into some much needed organizational- changes,
albeit minor ones. The U. S. Navy is the farthest ahead with
two sizeable units dedicated to planning and implementing
deception during both peacetime and wartime. The U. S. Army
has recognized the need for dedicated deception staffs at
its field headquarters. And the U. S. Air Force has given its
commanders the leeway to place at least one deception
officer on their immediate staffs within the Tactical Air
Control System. In addition to these wartime slots for the
Army and Air Force, both services have a few peacetime
assigned deception officers to maintain the modest programs
that have been established. All this will be for naught,
however, if commanders are not taught that deception is a
highly effective combat tool and then required to
incorporate it in their operations plans.
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In closing, it should be apparent that there is a
considerable difference in the way the Soviets view and
employ deception and the way the U. S. treats it. We can be
assured that the Soviet military will use deception in any
major conflict. They will prove to be quite skilled in its
employment and the effect could be disastrous for their
opponent. The United States military is currently in the
initial stages of a "rediscovery" of the value of deception.
The momentum is there and it should be maintained. Our goal
in emphasizing deception should not be to simply counter a
Soviet emphasis, but instead, to increase our chances of
success in combat. However, even if we do nothing to change
our capability to employ deception, we must realize that we
may one day face Soviet soldiers in combat, soldiers who
will be ready, willing, and skilled in the use of deception.
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APPENDIX A
SOVIET WWII DECEPTION DIRECTIVES
1. DOCUMENT NUMBER 1
This is a directive of the Soviet Air Force Commander on
"Airfield Camouflage and Concealment and Measures Helping to
Reduce Losses," dated 9 July 1941:
1. When basing aviation at airfields, station not more
than 9-12 airpl-anes at each.
2. After airplanes land, immediately disperse them among
temporary parking pads, camouflage them, and taxi them
into shelters. Dig trenches for flight technicians.
3. Establish the strictest camouflage and concealment
discipline at airfields; prohibit overt walking on the
landing strip, driving in motor vehicles, and so on.
4. Implement deceptive measures at airfields which are
already known to the enemy, making them appear
destroyed and abandoned ....
Signed by Soviet Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General
of Aviation Zhigarev. CRef . 21: pp. 59-60]
2. DOCUMENT NUMBER 2
This is from an order of the Soviet Air Force Commander,
dated 22 June 1942:
1. The commanders of frontal air forces, the commanders
of air armies and the commanders of frontal district
air forces are to draw up, within three days, measures
to develop camouflage and concealment of operating
airfields and create dummy airfields; they are to plan
the work that must be performed, the materials
required for this purpose, the amount of manpower, its
source, the officials responsible for the work, and
the deadlines for completing the work.
2. All free personnel of airfield maintenance battalions
and line units are to be employed in efforts to
camouflage and conceal airfields and the airplanes
stationed at them, and to build dummy airfields.
Creation of dummy airfields and erection of airplane
models at operating airfields is to be practiced
broadly .... The issue of allocating manpower and
resources with which to camouflage and conceal
airfields is to be brought up for discussion by
frontal military councils. . .
Signed by Soviet Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General
of Aviation Novikov. CRef. 21: p. 60]
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3. DOCUMENT NUMBER 3
This is from an order from the Rear Services of the 8th
Air Army on "The Status of Camouflage, Concealment and
Deception in Aviation Base Areas," dated 7 January 1943:
1. The chiefs of aviation base areas are to create one
dummy night airfield next to each real airfield by the
end of the day after their arrival at a new base of
operations.
2. In the first day of its operation, a dummy airfield
must possess one hut, two or three slit trenches to
shelter four or five persons of a maintenance squad
outfitted with a flare pistol and flares, and rifles
or machineguns with tracer rounds < a lit "T with
marker lights, and two or three aircraft mock-ups. In
the following days, the dummy night airfield is to be
reoutfitted as a 24-hour airfield.
Signed by 8th Air Army Deputy Commander for Rear
Services, Major General of Aviation Ryabtsev. CRef . 21: p.
61]
4. DOCUMENT NUMBER 4
This is from a directive of the Commander of the 15th
Air Army to the Chiefs of Aviation Base Areas on
"Preparations to Support Summer Combat Activities," dated 5
May 1943:
1. The chiefs of aviation base areas are to ensure
regular aerial inspection of the effectiveness of
camouflage and concealment of real airfields, and of
the operation of dummy airfields, for which purpose a
U-2 airplane is to be allocated to the chief of the
camouflage and concealment service not less than three
times a month. The inspection is to be conducted from
an altitude of 800-1000 meters. The inspection results
are to be reported immediately to the rear services
staff ....
Signed by 15th Air Army Commander, Major General of
Aviation Pyatykhin. CRef. 21: p. 61]
5. DOCUMENT NUMBER 5
This is an order to the Rear Services of the 15th Air
Army on "Camouflage, Concealment and Deception Measures in
an Offensive," dated 26 March 1944:
1. Mock-up workshops in the 21st, 56th, 75th and 80th
aviation base areas are to be reorganized as forward
camouflage and concealment squads. Two motor vehicles
are to be allocated to each squad: one GAZ-AA to
provide transportation to the squad personnel, and one
ZlS-5 to transport a maximum quantity of prefabricated
mobile mock-ups.
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2. The squads are henceforth placed under the
subordination of the army chief of the Army Camouflage
and Concealment Service, from whom all appropriate
assignments to build dummy airfields will be received.
The squads are to maintain communication with ground
troops and advance behind them ....
3. The squads have the mission of not only building dummy
airfields but also operating them. All work is to be
performed covertly ....
4. I turn the attention of aviation base area chiefs to
the fact that when they move forward, all
prefabricated mobile airplane mock-ups must be
immediately transported and rebuilt at newly opened
dummy 24-hour airfields, one for each airfield
maintenance battalion ....
Signed by 15th Air Army Deputy Commander for Rear




SOVIET WORLD WAR II DECEPTION STAFF ORDER
This was an order signed by the commander of the 18th
Army, by order of the 1st Ukrainian Front Commander, to
establish a special deception planning staff.
1. Perform simulation of tank army concentration in
vicinity of Vinograd, Kolomya, Zabolotuv in the period
from 4 through 20 July 1944.
2. For immediate direction of all simulation measures,
assign an operations group made up of the following:
chief of operations group--deputy chief of army staff
operations department Col Soloveykin, Col Stopog from
engineer troops staff, Lt Col Yakovlev from artillery
staff. Col Pisarikhin from staff of BT and MV ( armored
and mechanized troops), Lt Col Fiktor from
communications department, Lt Col Shcherbak from
political department. Engr-Maj Nikulchenko from VOSO
^military transportation) department, and Lt Col
Bartenyev from the chemical department.
3. Subordinate operations group directly to army chief of
staff and provide it with means of transportation from
the 201st Motor Transport Platoon.
4. My deputy for engineer troops. Col Zhurin, is to
ensure the building of 500 tank mockups, 200 vehicle
mockups, 600 gun mockups, and 100 field kitchen
mockups using resources of two engineer battalions and
two rifle battalions from the 66tn Guards Rifle
"Division by 20 July 1944, placing them in areas
according to the plan ....
5. The artillery commander is to place three gun
batteries on mechanical traction and one AAA regiment
for screening assembly areas at the disposal of the
chief of the operations group.
6. The commander of BT and MV ( armored and mechanized
troops) is to place two batteries at the operations
group chief s disposal from the 1448th Self-propelled
Artillery Regiment and five motorcycles for use in
unloading and assembly areas.
7. Army signal officer^ Maj General Muravyev, is to
arrange a dummy radio link according to the plan of
the front signal officer for deception of the enemy,
having the army RSB in Soroki and corps RSBs in the
areas of Vinograd and Kobylets.
8. Political department chief. Col Brezhnev, is to place
one MGU (powerful loudspeaker) sound broadcasting
station at the disposal of the operations group chief
and, together with the chief of the army staff
intelligence department, organize deception of the
local populace with respect to the concentration of
major tank forces and offensive being prepared in the
army sector. Use 15 officers for spreading false
information among the populace.
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9. VOSO (military transport) chief. Col Zelenin, is to
support through the front VOSO the measures being
carried out by rolling stock (a locomotive, 30
flatcars, and 3 boxcars). Arrange the train's progress
according to the schedule of the operations group
chief.
10. My deputy for rear- services, Maj General Baranov, is
to support uninterrupted operation of motor transport
for the entire period of the activities, releasing
fuel on requisitions of the army chief of engineer
troops with my approval.
11. Chief of the army chemical service is to provide
blanketing in vicinity of Stefaneshti Station, Yasunuv
Polny Station, 1-2 kilometers west of Dzurkuv and 1-2
kilometers south of Venyava, assigning the chemical
company of 65th Guards Rifle Division and 5,000 smoke
pots for this purpose.
12. Engr-Mai Momotov, representative of the 1st Ukrainian
Front staff, provides consultation on matters of
operational camouflage, concealment, and deception.
13. Report daily to operations group chief on progress of
simulation work ....
Signed by Commander of 18th Army, Lt General Zhuravlev.
CRef. 16: pp. 29-31]
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